

JPRS-UMA-86-003

14 January 1986

# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No. 8, August 1985

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14 January 1986

# USSR REPORT

## MILITARY AFFAIRS

### MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 8, August 1985

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

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CSO: 1801/33



MAJ GEN SKYLNİK DISCUSSES LEADING ROLE OF CPSU

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 85 (signed to press 23 Jul 85) pp 3-8

[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Maj Gen A. I. Skylnik under the rubric "Toward the 27th CPSU Congress": "The CPSU is the Militant Vanguard of the Soviet People"]

[Text] The Leninist party of Communists is preparing for its 27th Congress with a feeling of confidence and optimism. It gives an active, businesslike and, at the same time, critical direction to its creative, constructive work by comprehensively evaluating what has been achieved by the Soviet country and determining the prospects of its further development. In his report at the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum, Comrade M. S. Gorbachev said: "The forthcoming 27th CPSU Congress will doubtless become a landmark in the country's development. Its significance is determined by the paramount importance of the issues submitted for discussion, by the nature of the present period, and by the newness and scale of the tasks facing society."(1)

To move forward by relying on what has already been achieved and concentrating the efforts of the workers' class and all the working people on the key problems of perfecting the life of society -- such is the chief aspect of CPSU activity in the conditions of direct preparation for the 27th Congress.

The new social system has proven its great historical advantages many times over. At the same time, a natural law has become manifest: A powerful organizing and guiding force is needed to realize the potentials of socialism and to bring them into operation. The CPSU is this force in our society. Only the CPSU is capable of taking into account the interests of all classes and social groups, all nations and nationalities in our country, rallying them together, and mobilizing the people's energy for the common task of great creation.

Today, when, under the leadership of the party, our country has become a powerful, flourishing power confidently paving the way to a communist future, V. I. Lenin's words written at the beginning of the century have a special ring to them: "...give us an organization of revolutionaries and we will turn Russia inside out."(2)

From the very beginning the Bolshevik Party was a party of great goals, a party of revolutionary action. Prominent events of the 20th Century are connected with its activity: the victory of the Great October Revolution, the defeat of the united forces of internal counterrevolution and international imperialism, and the victorious conclusion of the civil war. The industrialization of the country, the collectivization of agriculture and the cultural revolution were successfully carried out under the leadership of the party. Nations and nationalities were united in one friendly family.

In the terrible time of the Great Patriotic War the party was the inspirer and organizer of the nationwide struggle against the German fascist invaders. Under its leadership the armed forces were deployed and equipped with everything necessary in the shortest possible space of time, and they crushed the aggressor and crowned the bitter struggle against it with a great victory.

The Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, have built a developed socialist society and are successfully implementing the detailed program of construction initiated by the 26th Congress and elaborated in the resolutions of subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums.

The successes of the party's reorganizing activities are the results of the fact that the party is invariably guided by Marxist-Leninist teaching, while creatively developing this teaching and ensuring an organic unity between revolutionary theory and practice. It is the tradition of the Leninist party to provide a concise but full theoretical formula reflecting the essence of the next stage and the distinctive nature of the new tasks at every major, crucial, historical frontier and to promote political slogans making it possible to combine the latest conclusions of revolutionary theory with the practical activity of the masses, and the ideas and will of the party with the thoughts and will of millions.

In recent years the treasurehouse of Marxism-Leninism has been enriched with new, important theoretical theses and conclusions. The concept of developed socialism is exceptionally rich in content. As a major achievement of scientific thought, it enables the party to determine its strategy and tactics for both the immediate and the long-term future and its course to accelerate the country's socioeconomic development, strengthen its economic and defense might and improve the working and living conditions of the Soviet people. A number of concrete theses, the conclusions of contemporary Marxist-Leninist thinking, the latest experience of the CPSU and fraternal parties and the realities of world processes will be reflected in the new edition of the party program which will be adopted at the 27th CPSU Congress.

With the construction of developed socialism in our country the CPSU, while remaining by its very nature the party of the working class, has at the same time become the vanguard of all the people. There are now more than 18 million Communists in its ranks, of which approximately 8 million are workers (more than 44 percent of all party members). More than 59 percent of those now being admitted into the party are workers. Together, workers and peasants comprise more than half of all Soviet Communists. No less than one-quarter of those annually admitted into the CPSU are representatives of the intelligentsia. Within the party every fourth or fifth member is a specialist in the national economy, every second member is a scientist or a writer, every

fourth member is a teacher and every sixth member is a doctor.(3) The Leninist party is the party of internationalists and the embodiment of the unity of the peoples of the USSR. Its members are representatives of all the country's nations and nationalities.

Without permitting new members to be admitted at a forced pace, the party devotes paramount attention to carefully selecting progressive people, primarily from the workers' class, and conducts a vast amount of work to educate young Communists in the spirit of high principles and strict observance of the CPSU statutes and the norms and traditions of party life. High exactingness toward every Communist is an essential condition of further enhancing the authority won by the party among the masses. The April Plenum stressed that it is necessary to increase the demand made of every party member regarding his attitude toward social duty, his fulfillment of party decisions and his honest, pure image as a party member.

The CPSU Central Committee orients pregress party meetings and conferences toward efficiency, adherence to principle and a self-critical approach to evaluating the work of party organizations and their leading organs.

The powerful transforming strength of the Leninist party lies in its close ties with the masses. The party constantly compares its decisions and actions with the ideas of the workers' class and its keen sociopolitical sense, pays close attention to what is said among the workers, the front ranks of socialist construction, and constantly keeps the working people within the channel of the problems being resolved. The CPSU Central Committee regularly informs the Soviet people of the work of the Central Committee Politburo by publishing the most important resolutions of the party's central organs.

Building a new society is the task of millions of people, of all Soviet people. Being the collective leader of the workers' class, the vanguard of the working people, and the core of Soviet society's political system, the party constantly strengthens its ties with the masses. The CPSU shows tireless concern for perfecting the forms and methods of its relations with the masses. It consults with the working people on all the vital problems of social life and international development, openly discusses shortcomings and, together with the people, determines ways of overcoming them.

In the course of its preparation for the party congress, the Central Committee actively studies the proposals of leaders of industrial enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhoses, and of specialists and scientists, as well as the opinions of labor collectives, while working out the main aspects of the country's economic and social development, the acceleration of production intensification and the perfection of the mechanism of management.

The CPSU attaches particular significance to widely involving aware, politically mature, creatively minded citizens in state affairs. Its role in state and social organizations is not ensured by a numerical predominance of party members within them, but by the establishment of its political influence, tireless struggle for the good and happiness of the working people and the ability to develop and implement policies which meet the requirements of every new stage in the development of Soviet society.



The powerful strength of our party lies in the fact that it critically analyzes the results of its activity and constantly studies, evaluates, and utilizes the experience of fraternal parties of socialist countries and of the entire international communist movement. Realism in the appraisal of what has been achieved and boldness in the setting of new tasks characterizes the leading activities of the CPSU in contemporary life.

A realistic, sober, and creative approach to matters is becoming more and more firmly established in CPSU activity.

The struggle, developed on the party's initiative, to strengthen party, state and labor discipline everywhere and to increase the responsibility of each and every one -- from the workers to the minister -- has received the ardent approval and support of Soviet people. It is in many ways thanks to this that positive changes have been achieved in the last 2 years in various branches of the national economy. The measures adopted have not only yielded an economic effect, but have also had a moral effect and have helped to consolidate the situation of general exactingness and irreconcilability toward shortcomings hindering our progress forward.

The CPSU has defined the making of a big move in the direction of practically resolving the tasks of perfecting our socialist society as a key problem in its contemporary strategy. Implementation of this strategy presupposes further mobilizing the creative strengths of the working people, developing their initiative and raising the level of party and economic leadership.

Party leadership of the creative activity of millions is ensured by means of setting the key tasks of economic and social policy, mobilizing the masses to implement this policy and organizing control over this implementation. The 11th Five-Year Plan adopted at the 26th CPSU Congress serves as a powerful accelerator of Soviet people's energy and as a source of inspiration for increasing their enthusiasm, optimism and confidence in the triumph of their great cause. Much of what was planned 5 years ago has become visibly embodied in the increased capacities of the Soviet economy and in the further flourishing of all aspects of the Soviet way of life. It is precisely during these years that work has developed to realize such grandiose projects as the food and energy programs, the plan to develop agriculture in the non-Chernozem oblasts of the RSFSR, and the development of the natural wealth of Siberia and the Far East. A comprehensive program to develop the production of consumer goods and the services sphere is being drawn up. All this is convincing evidence of the party's ability to find effective ways of resolving mature socioeconomic problems.

On the threshold of the 27th Congress, the party has developed a strategy for the socioeconomic development of the country on the basis of scientific-technical progress. As the conference on questions of scientific-technical progress noted, what is involved is a new quality of our development, rapid forward movement in strategically important areas, structural reorganization of production and its shift to an intensive track, effective forms of management and fuller solving of social problems. The dialectics of development are such that the advances made by our country widen the historical horizons and set our people more complex and responsible tasks. Ways of solving these tasks are elaborated in the draft of the Basic

Directions of the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for the Year 1986-1990 and for the Period to 2000, which is being developed in the course of the preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress. An increase in the rates of development of all branches of the national economy is envisaged, as are the intensification of the processes of production intensification, the acceleration of scientific-technical progress and the strengthening of the country's economic and defense might. A wide-scale social program embracing all aspects of the life of Soviet people is planned. The commanding order of the times is to move to the most advanced positions of increasing labor productivity, product quality and production efficiency, as a whole, in a short historical space of time.

Today the party is putting forward the rapid acceleration of scientific-technical progress as the main strategic lever for intensifying production. The leading direction of this progress, as was stated at the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum, is further and high-priority development of machine building, especially machine tool building, instrument making, computer technology and electronics. The rates of development and the course of competition with capitalism will depend on how we solve the problem of accelerating scientific-technical progress and of effective and rapid utilization of the achievements of science.

In organic unity with the tasks of intensifying social production, the party is solving an entire complex of problems of management and of perfecting its organizational structure, of planning and of restructuring the economic mechanism. A large-scale economic experiment is being conducted in our country with the aim of testing innovation in practice and of preparing labor collectives and cadres of leaders for them. The essence of this experiment is to create more favorable conditions in production for developing the social activeness and initiative of labor collectives and to increase their material interest in the steady growth of final results through fuller utilization of the achievements of science and technology.

The party regards the ultimate meaning of the acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development as being to increase step by step the people's welfare and to improve all aspects of the life of Soviet people. It is consistently implementing its policy of strengthening social justice in the distribution of material and spiritual goods. As the April Plenum noted, the task is now to develop concrete, effective measures to cleanse the distribution mechanism of leveling, unearned income and all that is contrary to the economic norms and moral ideals of our society. The task has been set of ensuring the direct dependence of the material position of each worker and each collective on the results of their work.

The party is conducting a resolute struggle against all negative phenomena which are alien to the socialist way of life and to our communist morality. The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee "On Measures to Overcome Drunkenness and Alcoholism" has received universal approval and active support from Soviet people. The public is rising up everywhere against the consumption of spirits, and in labor collectives an atmosphere of intolerance toward drunkenness and toward any violations of discipline and order is being created. Administrative, legal and educational efforts are being reinforced with the perfecting of the everyday life of working people, with the



introduction of new traditions and contemporary rites and with the improvement in the organization of the population's leisure and of the sensible use of free time. The party is putting the material and spiritual forces of society into service for the formation of a new person and for the comprehensive and harmonious development of the individual.

The ideological and political-educational work of party organizations is becoming increasingly purposeful and effective. Its sense is that the ideas and decisions of the party should become the property of the masses and be turned into a material force for the transformation of society. It should be distinguished by a particular flexibility and by its sensitive and effective reaction to the problems and phenomena of life. The efforts of lecturers, propagandists and agitators, and the potential of the mass information media are aimed at a clear depiction of the historic achievements of socialism and at overcoming everything alien to our way of life.

The party's Central Committee is increasing the demands made on the theoretical content of ideological-educational work and is striving to make it comprehensive to and immediate for people, and thus more effective.

The party is solving foreign policy questions from principled and realistic positions. It opposes raging militarism and the sharply increased aggressiveness of reactionary forces led by U.S. imperialism with a constructive program of struggling to avoid war.

Mankind is faced with a choice: Will it be possible to correct the unfavorable course of events, or will the nuclear threat grow? This danger is being intensified many times over in connection with the plans of the United States to militarize outer space. Whatever their authors might say, and however they might justify themselves, the essence of these plans is clear: It is to acquire the possibility of being the first to inflict a nuclear strike on the USSR, and to inflict it with impunity. Since the United States and NATO categorically refuse to follow the USSR's example and assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, their intentions are taking on an extraordinary dangerous nature.

The Leninist party states with all responsibility: The Soviet Union and the other member states in the Warsaw Pact are not seeking superiority over anyone. But they will not permit the military-strategic parity to be upset, either. This is the firm common position of the Warsaw Pact member countries. If the preparations for "star wars" continue, we will have no other choice than to take the necessary countermeasures.

Lenin's teaching on the defense of the socialist fatherland lies at the basis of the CPSU's activity in the sphere of the country's defense. The party directs and coordinates the activity of state organs and institutions, mass

social organizations and all working people in further strengthening the country's security.

Party leadership is the fundamental principle of Soviet military build-up. It is expressed in the perfecting of the Armed Forces' organizational structure, in the increasing of their technical supply, in the training of highly

qualified, ideologically tempered and politically aware military cadres, and in the education and training of the soldiers. Combining the functions of political leader and of organizer and educator of the masses in its activity, the party links together the development of theoretical propositions concerning Soviet military build-up with their implementation and practical realization.

Thanks to the care of the party and the work of the people, the armed Forces possess everything necessary to fulfill their patriotic and international duty. The Central Committee April Plenum stressed: "We shall continue to spare no efforts so that the Armed Forces of the USSR have everything necessary for the reliable defense of our fatherland and its allies, and so that no one can catch us unawares."<sup>(4)</sup>

The economy of our society and the mighty scientific-technical potential of the Soviet country make it possible to effectively solve a wide range of tasks in the sphere of military build-up. The technical supply of the Army and Navy is being strengthened, their organizational structure is being perfected and their mobility, strike force and firepower are growing.

In the face of the military threat from imperialism, the party's demands on the combat readiness of the Armed Forces are increasing. The particular attention of military councils, commanders, political organs and party and Komsomol organizations is being concentrated on increasing the quality of the combat training of troops and naval forces. The fulfillment by every serviceman, subunit, unit and ship of the socialist obligations adopted in honor of the 27th CPSU Congress is now becoming a most important task.

Party-political work is a powerful means of further increasing the combat readiness of the Army and Navy. It is aimed at further uniting Armed Forces personnel around the Communist Party and the Soviet government, at increasing the political vigilance, discipline and military skills of soldiers and at mobilizing them for worthy preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 24 April 1985.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works," Vol 6, p 127.
3. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 June 1984.
4. PRAVDA, 24 April 1985.

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CSO: 1801/34-F

## DEFEAT OF THE KWANTUNG ARMY IN THE FAR EAST

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 85 (signed to press 23 Jul 85) pp 9-19

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of Socialist Labor, Army Gen I. M. Tretyak, under the rubric "On the 40th Anniversary of the Great Victory"]

[Text] At the beginning of May 1945, the war in Europe had ended and Nazi Germany had unconditionally surrendered. However, in the nations of Southeast Asia, the Far East and the Pacific Basin, military actions were still continuing. Here the U.S. and British governments, having realistically assessed the existing military-political situation, concluded that it would be impossible to bring about a rapid victory without the Soviet Union.

The decision of the Soviet government to enter the war against Japan was not only a debt to its Allies in the anti-Hitler coalition but also corresponded to state interests and was necessitated by the defense of its Far Eastern frontiers.

For an extended period, Japan had repeatedly attacked the Soviet Union. In the course of the Great Patriotic War, in flagrantly violating the Neutrality Pact, it systematically carried out military provocations and tied down significant forces essential for military operations on the Soviet-German Front.

The continuing of the war by Japan maintained the threat to the frontiers and interests of the Soviet Union in the Far East and created an extremely tense situation here. The Japanese had turned Korea and the northeastern provinces of China into a staging area for aggression against our country. The million-strong Kwantung Army was deployed directly along the frontiers with the Soviet Union and Mongolia and by August 1945, this army consisted of 2 fronts, 2 separate armies (24 infantry divisions, 9 mixed brigades, 2 tank brigades and a brigade of suicide troops), the 2d Air Army as well as the Sungari River Flotilla. As a total along the Soviet frontiers, by the start of military operations, there were concentrated the troops of 3 fronts, a separate army, a portion of the forces of the Fifth Front, several individual regiments, a river naval flotilla and 2 air armies numbering over 1 million men. The Japanese army was armed with 1,215 tanks, 6,640 guns and mortars, 1,907

aircraft and 26 ships of the river flotilla.(1) In addition, here was located a significant number of Japanese police and railroad formations as well as the troops of Manchukuo and the Japanese puppet, the Prince of Inner Mongolia, Die Wang. On the frontier with the USSR and Mongolia there were 17 fortified areas with around 800 km of fortifications including over 4,500 permanent installations.(2)

The Japanese Command planned to put up stubborn resistance against the Soviet-Mongolian troops in the border fortified areas and then defeat these troops in the mountain ranges blocking the paths from the Mongolian territory, the Transbaykal, the Amur and Maritime areas into the central regions of Manchuria. In the event of the breakthrough of this line, the Japanese troops would be permitted to retreat to the line of Tumyn, Changchun, Mukden and Jingzhou, where a defensive was to be organized to prevent the further advance of the Soviet Army to the south and southeast and to keep Korea and Southeast Manchuria as a staging area for subsequent active operations.

For defeating the Kwantung Army and liberating Manchuria and North Korea from the occupiers, the Soviet Supreme High Command fielded three fronts: the Transbaykal, the First and Second Far Eastern (up to 5 August, respectively, the Maritime Group of Forces and the Far Eastern Front). The Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Naval Flotilla were also to be involved in the operation.


The Soviet and Mongolian troops numbered more than 1.5 million men, over 26,000 guns and mortars (not counting antiaircraft artillery), around 5,300 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount] and 5,200 aircraft (counting the aviation of the Pacific Fleet and the Air Defense Troops of the Nation's Territory).(3)

**The plan of the Manchurian Strategic Operation** consisted in the simultaneous launching of two main pincer attacks (from Mongolian territory and the Maritime Area) converging on central Manchuria and several auxiliary thrusts, the splitting of the main grouping of the Kwantung Army, the surrounding and subsequent piecemeal destruction of it, and the capturing of the major military-political centers of Manchuria (see the diagram). The leading role in carrying out the plan of the operation was assigned to the Transbaykal and First Far Eastern Fronts. For this reason their assault groupings were to include from 60 to 70 percent of all the forces concentrated in the Far East.

Proceeding from the mission received and also considering the lack of prepared defenses for the Japanese troops in the border area and the terrain conditions making it possible to successfully employ all branches of troops right up to the Greater Khingan, the **Commander of the Transbaykal Front, MSU R. Ya. Malinovskiy** took a decision to launch the main thrust using the forces of the 17th, 39th and 53d Combined-Arms Armies and the 6th Guards Tank Army in outflanking to the south the Halun-Arshan Fortified Area on the general axis of Changchun and by the 15th day of the operation to capture the line of Dabanshan, Lubei, Solun (a depth of 350 km). The tank army was to reach this line no later than the 5th day of the operation. Subsequently, the assault grouping of the front was to develop the offensive to the southeast and reach the line of Chifeng, Shenyang, Changchun, Zhalantun (a depth of 800 km), where



in cooperation with the First Far Eastern Front the main Japanese forces were



The Manchurian Offensive Operation, 9 August-2 September 1945

Key: 1--Position of Soviet and Mongolian troops by end of 8 August; 2--Fortified areas, strongpoints and defensive lines of the Japanese troops; 3--Troop concentration areas of Soviet forces; 4--Same for Japanese, Manchukuo, Inner Mongolia and Suiyuan Army Group; 5--Axes of thrusts of 9-19 August of Soviet troops; 6--Of Cavalry-Mechanized Group of Soviet-Mongolian Troops; 7--Lines reached by Soviet and Soviet-Mongolian troops by end of 19 August; 8--Advance of Soviet troops from 20 August through 2 September; 9--Operations of Amur Naval Flotilla; 10--Demarcation lines between operational zones of Soviet and American fleets; 11--Surrender of enemy troops; 12--Soviet airborne landings; 13--Soviet naval landings; 14--Red Banner Army; 15--Far Eastern Front



to be fully surrounded. Two auxiliary thrusts were planned: by the forces of the cavalry-mechanized group [KMG] of Soviet-Mongolian troops on the general axes of Dolonnor and Kalgan and by the 36th Army against Hailar.

**The Commander of the First Far Eastern Front, MSU K. A. Meretskov,** decided to launch the main attack by forces of the 1st Red Banner All-Arms Army and the 5th All-Arms Army on the Mudanjiang axis, to break through the border fortified areas, to rout the enemy and on the 15th-18th day of the operation reach the line of Boli, Mudanjiang, Wangqing (depth of 150-180 km). Subsequently, the main forces were to advance on the Girin, Chungchun axis to meet up with the troops of the Transbaykal Front and in cooperation with them to complete the encirclement of the main forces of the Kwantung Army on the Manchurian Plain (depth of operation 500 km). A portion of the forces was to advance on Harbin with the mission of assisting the troops of the Second Far Eastern Front. The flanks of the assault grouping were to be supported by the advance of the 35th and 25th Armies.

**The Commander of the Second Far Eastern Front, Army Gen M. A. Purkayev,** planned to cross the large Amur and Ussuri Rivers in close cooperation with the Red Banner Amur Naval Flotilla and get through the fortified areas on the opposite banks of the rivers. The main thrust was to be launched by forces of the 15th Army from the Leninskoye area along the Sungari River and by two brigades of ships from the Amur Naval Flotilla against Ilan (Sanxing), Harbin and by the 23d day of the operation to capture the Jiamusi area. An auxiliary thrust was to be launched by troops of the V Separate Rifle Corps together with a brigade of flotilla ships on the Raohei sector from the Bikin area. In exploiting the success of the main groupings of the Transbaykal and First Far Eastern Front, the 2d Red Banner Army was to launch an auxiliary thrust from the Blagoveshchensk area against Tsitsikar.

**The Pacific Fleet (Commander, Adm I. S. Yumashev)** was to cover our ports and sea lanes and to assist the ground troops in capturing the ports and naval bases in North Korea and on Sakhalin.

Ensuring continuous strategic leadership over the armed forces in the vast theater of operations necessitated the establishing of a **High Command of Soviet Forces in the Far East**. The establishing of an intermediate operational-strategic command element was also necessitated by the significant distance of the theater of operations, by the enormous extent of the front of forthcoming operations and by the depth of the operation, by the separateness of the strategic and operational sectors, and by the large number of troops and forces to be involved. MSU A. M. Vasilevskiy was appointed commander-in-chief, Lt Gen I. V. Shikin was the military council member and Col Gen S. P. Ivanov the chief of staff. All the ground forces, the air forces, Navy, air defense troops and rear bodies to be deployed in the theater were put at the disposal of the commander-in-chief.

At the same time Hq SHC [Headquarters Supreme High Command] and the General Staff as before had direct contact with the fronts and the fleet. But the organization of the High Command provided an opportunity to promptly carry out the instructions of the Supreme High Command to defeat the Kwantung Army, to

give thorough consideration to all changes in the strategic and operational situation and to respond effectively to them.

On 8 August 1945, the Soviet government announced to the Japanese ambassador in Moscow that as of the following day the Soviet Union would consider itself in a state of war with Japan.

**During the night of 9 August, the Soviet troops went over to the offensive simultaneously on all three fronts.** Specially organized and trained detachments of border troops, forward and reconnaissance detachments from the first echelon formations, having crossed the Amur, Ussuri and Argun Rivers, by decisive attacks destroyed the enemy strongpoints in the border area and thereby supported the advance of the main forces.

Since the enemy did not have a prepared defense in the area of the assault grouping of the Transbaykal Front, the offensive started without artillery and air softening up. On the very first days of the offensive, the front's assault grouping achieved significant results. Particularly major successes were achieved by the 6th Guards Tank Army. In 2 days it crossed a 300-km semidesert area and on the third day the Greater Khingan Range. By 14 August, the front's field forces had reached the central areas of Northeast China.

On the First Far Eastern Front the advancing troops encountered strong enemy resistance on the fortified areas. The difficulty of advance was exacerbated by the fact that the offensive was carried out in mountain-tayga terrain with a complete lack of roads. As a result of the first 4 days of the operation, the formations and units of the 5th Army had broken through the strong enemy border fortifications, they had fought their way more than 100 km, they had swept the Japanese from the prepared defensive lines on the western bank of the Mulinghe River and had initiated battle on the external perimeter of the Mudanjiang fortifications. Soviet troops split the Japanese groupings and by 14 August had advanced 120-150 km into the interior of Manchuria.

During the night of 9 August, the armies of the Second Far Eastern Front went over to the offensive on the Sungari and Raohei sectors. During 9 and 10 August, with support from the ships of the Amur Naval Flotilla they crossed the Amur, they captured beachheads on the opposite bank and subsequently thrust deep into the country. By 14 August, the front's troops had advanced 50-200 km, causing the enemy great losses.

Considering the successes achieved by the fronts advancing from the Transbaykal, Maritime and Amur areas, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Soviet Troops in the Far East took a decision to begin the liberation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. The Southern Sakhalin Operation commenced on 11 August and the Kuril Landing Operation on 18 August. They ended, respectively, on 25 August and 1 September. In fierce battles against a strong enemy, the men of the Soviet Army and the sailors of the Pacific Fleet honorably carried out the missions set for them.

In 24 days, in advancing on a front over 5,000 km, Soviet troops in cooperation with the Pacific Fleet and Amur Naval Flotilla routed the Kwantung

Army. Advancing to a depth of 200-800 km, they liberated Northeast China, North Korea, Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.(4)

The defeat of the Kwantung Army was a major contribution of the USSR to victory over Japan. On 2 September, the Japanese government signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender. With its defeat the last center of World War II was eliminated.

The Soviet Union recovered the territories previously taken from it and this significantly strengthened the security of the Soviet frontiers in the East and provided an opportunity for our fleet to gain access to the Pacific Ocean.

The defeat of the Kwantung Army and the surrender of imperialist Japan created favorable conditions for the peoples of East and Southeast Asia to fight for independence and sociopolitical changes. The USSR provided enormous aid to the Chinese people. Manchuria which was liberated by the Soviet Army became a secure military-strategic staging area for the Chinese revolutionary forces and a new political center of the Chinese revolution.

The military operations in the Far East demonstrated the superiority of Soviet military art over the military art of Japan. This art underwent further development and rose to a higher level.

In the strategy area. The Manchurian Operation has gone down in history as one of the major strategic operations of World War II. It involved the troops of three fronts, a portion of the forces of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Naval Flotilla.

The overall concept of the Manchurian Strategic Operation was characterized by purposefulness and focused the troops of the fronts on conducting decisive operations and ensured the rapid defeat of the Kwantung Army. The launching of two powerful encounter attacks made it possible to quickly complete the encirclement of the main forces of the enemy grouping. In selecting the axes of these thrusts consideration was given to the configuration of the state frontier which was advantageous for the Soviet troops, the nature of the location of the enemy fortified areas and the particular features in the operational configuration of its troops.

An important prerequisite for the success of the Manchurian Operation was the establishing of strong offensive groupings on the chosen sectors. As is known, prior to May 1945, the Far Eastern Grouping of Soviet Troops carried out defensive missions. In the aim of reinforcing it it was essential to shift the troops which had been released in Europe to the Far East over a distance of 8,000-12,000 km. This unprecedented maneuver by a portion of the Armed Forces to the new theater was carried out in a comparatively short time (May-8 August 1945). As a total during this period, some 2 front and 4 army headquarters, 15 headquarters of rifle, artillery, tank and mechanized corps, 36 rifle, artillery and antiaircraft artillery divisions, 53 brigades of the main branches of ground forces and 2 fortified areas were regrouped and this represented a total of 30 full-strength divisions.(5)



In establishing the troop grouping, consideration was given to the experience gained by the troops in the course of combat on the Soviet-German Front. The field forces and formations which had participated in breaking through heavily fortified positions were incorporated in the First Far Eastern Front as in front of these the Japanese had established a solid zone of permanent defensive fortifications. Troops having experience in fighting under mountainous conditions were basically sent to the Transbaykal Front, since the Greater Khingan had to be crossed in their area.

Also instructive is the experience of the operational-strategic cover for the deployment of the Soviet troops. Due to the fact that the opposing more than a million-strong Japanese grouping was ready for active operations, the field troops and fortified areas were in a state of full combat readiness for conducting defensive actions. The troop detraining stations, the major railroad junctions and the concentration areas were covered by the established air defense system. Measures were provided to combat enemy airborne troops. Reconnaissance was strengthened as much as possible and coastal defenses were brought to full readiness. The border troops increased the security of the state frontier.

An important factor in the successful execution of the operation was the surprise of the going over of the Soviet troops to the offensive. This was achieved by carrying out a whole series of special measures. Of particular significance was the ensuring of secrecy in moving large forces from the West to the Far East. For this purpose the persons who had access to the planning, supervision and accounting for the troop movements was restricted while telephone calls and correspondence on these questions were prohibited. In the border areas, the movement of the individual groups of troop trains and their unloading were carried out during darkness.

A strictly limited group of persons was also permitted to work out the plans of the fronts. Only the commander, the military council member, the chief of staff and the chief of the operations administration of the front knew them fully. All troop movements during the period of their concentration and deployment were carried out only at night. Careful camouflage of the troops and equipment was provided in the concentration areas. The radios of the troops which had arrived in the Far East and all the newly deployed radio nets operated only for receiving up to the morning of 9 August. Peacetime conditions were maintained on the state frontier and in the troops. The Japanese did not succeed in establishing not only the total amount of troops moved into the theater but also the time they were to go over to the offensive, the scope of the operation and the axes of the main thrusts of the fronts.

Also instructive was the organizing of operational-strategic cooperation. As is known, a particular feature of the Manchurian Operation was the great separateness of the operational sectors and, consequently, the fronts, armies and even the formations fighting on these sectors. For example, there was a gap of 200 km between the 6th Guards Tank Army and the 17th Army which were part of the assault grouping of the Transbaykal Front.(6) Under these conditions the cooperation of the troops of the three fronts, the naval and flotilla forces within the strategic operation consisted in focusing their

efforts on achieving a quick defeat for the main forces of the Kwantung Army. In these interests the operational plan envisaged the simultaneous breakthrough of the enemy front on all the operational sectors and its development in operational depth at a rapid pace in order to deprive the enemy of the capacity to maneuver its forces along the front as well as effectively utilize reserves.

Cooperation was skillfully organized between the ground forces and the Pacific Fleet. In the course of the carrying out of the main mission by the troops of the fronts of defeating the Kwantung Army, the fleet disrupted the sea lines of communications of the enemy grouping in Manchuria with the homeland and covered the actions of the ground forces from the sea. In addition, a portion of the naval forces, by the landing of amphibious troops, directly cooperated with the First Far Eastern Front during its offensive in North Korea.

The Manchurian Offensive Operation was marked by high results. The enemy lost around 700,000 soldiers and officers, including 83,737 men killed and 594,000 taken prisoner.(7) The armies and field forces of Manchukuo, Inner Mongolia and the Suiyuan Army Group were disarmed and disbanded. The Soviet troops captured 1,836 guns, 2,474 mortars and grenade launchers, 686 tanks, 861 aircraft, 13,099 machine guns, 2,321 motor vehicles, all the ships of the Sungari River Flotilla and other military supplies.(8) The Japanese had never had such losses over all combat operations in the Pacific. As a result of the successful actions of the Soviet troops, Japan was quickly deprived of industrial and raw material resources in Northeast China, North Korea and Southern Sakhalin. All of this played a crucial role in the complete collapse of imperialist Japan and accelerated its final defeat and unconditional surrender.

Operation art also underwent further development. Within the strategic operation, the Transbaykal Front conducted the Khingan-Mukden Operation, the First Far Eastern Front carried out the Harbin-Girin and the Second Far Eastern Front the Sungari Operation. These were characterized by a diversity of combat methods and were carried out under various terrain conditions and a differing nature of enemy defenses. However, their common feature was a broad offensive to a great depth at a rapid pace.

The depth of the front operations was: 800 km for the Transbaykal Front and 200 km for the First Far Eastern. The carrying out of such deep missions by the fronts was supported by the launching of strong initial strikes, by the speed and continuous offensive of the Soviet troops and by air supremacy. These factors to a certain degree also influenced the high rate of advance of the troops. For the rifle field forces and formations this was 35-40 km a day and for the cavalry 50-60 km a day. The rate of advance of the armored and mechanized troops of the Transbaykal Front on individual days reached 150-160 km and averaged 70-90 km a day, while on the First Far Eastern Front this was 50 km a day and on the Second Far Eastern 40-50 km a day.(9)

The forward detachments played a major role in achieving such high rates of advance. These were established in virtually all first-echelon divisions and corps with a force from a tank battalion to a tank brigade, from several infantry companies up to a rifle regiment mounted on motor vehicles and



reinforced by an SAU battalion, an artillery battalion (regiment), by antitank and antiaircraft battalions as well as by other support subunits. Surprise, boldness and decisiveness were the basis of combat operations of the forward detachments.

A decisive supremacy over the enemy in men and weapons was established on the sector of the main thrust. Thus, in the Khingan-Mukden Operation some 70 percent of the rifle troops and up to 90 percent of the tanks and artillery were concentrated on the sector of the main thrust. This made it possible to establish superiority over the enemy of 1.7-fold for infantry, 4.5-fold for guns, 9.6-fold for mortars, 5.1-fold for tanks and SAU and 2.6-fold for aircraft. In the Harbin-Girin and Sungari Operations on the breakthrough sectors the ratio of men and weapons was also in our favor.(10)

A characteristic feature in the organization of the front offensive operations was the shallow operational configuration of the fronts. While in a number of major offensive operations conducted by Soviet troops against Nazi Germany the fronts frequently had one or two all-arms armies and one or two tank armies in the second echelons of the operations configuration, in the Manchurian Operation virtually all the forces of the fronts (with the exception of the 53d Army of the Transbaykal Front and the reserve LXXXVIII Rifle Corps of the First Far Eastern Front) were deployed in one operational echelon. This particular feature in the operational configuration of the assault groupings of the fronts was dictated by the desire of the Soviet Command to launch surprise and powerful strikes against the enemy which would make it possible to quickly overcome Japanese defenses in the border area and would ensure the subsequent development of the offensive at a rapid pace.

A new feature in the organization and implementation of the offensive by the troops of the Transbaykal Front was the use of a tank army and KMG in the first echelon. This was caused by the necessity of anticipating the enemy in deploying and capturing the passes over the Greater Khingan and quickly coming out in the central regions of Manchuria.

The questions of organizing and carrying out the crossing of water obstacles gained further development in operational art. The troops of the three fronts began offensive operations by crossing the large Argun, Amur, Ussuri and Sungach Rivers. While on the Soviet-German Front the crossing of such obstacles with planned preparation was carried out, as a rule, in daylight and started during the period of the artillery and air softening up, under the given conditions this was done at night without artillery and air softening up. In the crossing extensive use was made of amphibious motor vehicles, launches and tugs of the Amur Flotilla. Its combat ships supported troop actions by the firing of naval artillery and this was a powerful and effective and at times even the main means of fire support for our units and formations landing on the enemy shore.

In advancing into the interior of Manchuria the Soviet troops also had to cross water obstacles. The rainy season which coincided with combat operations caused an abrupt rise of the water in the rivers and increased the swampiness of their floodplains and this complicated the organizing of the crossings in the course of pursuit. Moreover, the limited number of roads

impeded and sometimes excluded the possibility of quickly delivering crossing equipment from the rear or along the front by maneuvering it. On-the-spot crossing equipment and lumber for building bridges were lacking. All of this necessitated a significant amount of TOE crossing equipment and ready-made elements for bridge and road work.

In the course of the Manchurian Operation, the **tactics of the Soviet troops** was improved. One of the important tasks of offensive combat remained the breaking through of fortified areas. In the Harbin-Girin Operation, for example, this was carried out at night, without artillery and air softening up. The surprise appearance of the forward detachments in the positions of the strongpoints and centers of resistance of the fortified areas caught the Japanese garrisons by surprise while the rapid actions of the troops excluded the possibility of organized resistance. Strongpoints were bypassed or sealed off. This success was immediately used for going over to the offensive by the main forces. The areas of advance in breaking through the fortified areas by the formations and units on the main sector were: 2-3 km for a division and 1-1.5 km for a regiment. For each kilometer of the breakthrough sector there were 200-240 guns and mortars and 30-40 tanks and SAU. Such high densities were achieved for the first time under the conditions of a mountainous-forested terrain during the war years.

The deep echeloning of the defensive positions on the maritime sector as well as the necessity of capturing the surviving enemy weapons installations determined certain particular features in the battle formations of the troops. It was essential to launch not only a strong initial strike but also to constantly increase it in the course of carrying out the set missions. For this reason the formations and units had a deeper configuration than under ordinary conditions of advance.

An essential element in the battle formation was the assault detachments (battalions) and assault groups. These were temporary formations specially trained in sealing off and destroying individual strongpoints and firing points of the permanent type. The number and composition of the assault detachments depended upon the quantity and nature of the enemy strongpoints.

One of the particular features in the command and control of the units and subunits in organizing the breakthrough of the enemy defense was that leadership of battle was provided from observation posts which were brought as close as possible to the troops (500-800 m from the first-echelon subunits). This made it possible for a division (regiment) commander to personally observe combat and effectively respond to the situation. With the going over to pursuit the command posts of the formations and units often moved in the columns of advancing troops.

The victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East was achieved due to the economic might of the Soviet Union which equipped its troops with everything necessary for successful combat. This was vivid proof of the might of the Soviet social and state system and an irrefutable advantage of Soviet military art. This victory was achieved due to the heroism and moral-political unity of the Soviet people led by the Communist Party. It brought glory and exaltation to our motherland, our people and their Armed Forces.

# FOOTNOTES

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2. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 11, 1980, p 180.
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4. See: ibid., pp 435, 437, 441.
5. Ibid., p 193.
6. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1975, p 19.
7. "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 4, 1959, p 745.
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CSO: 1801/33

## EMPLOYMENT OF AVIATION IN THE MANCHURIAN OPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 85 (signed to press 23 Jul 85) pp 20-24

[Interview with Mar Avn P. S. Kirsanov by Col O. K. Frantsev published under the rubric: "Our Interviews"]

[Text] The journal's editors have turned to Mar Avn Petr Semenovich Kirsanov with a request to tell about the employment of aviation in the Manchurian Offensive Operation. Below we publish the text of a talk by the editorial co-worker, Col O. K. Frantsev, with Mar Avn P. S. Kirsanov.

[Question] Comrade Marshal Aviation, what was the balance of forces for the sides prior to the carrying out of the Manchurian Operation?

[Answer] In quantitative terms, Soviet aviation surpassed Japanese by 2.5-fold. Our side also had a qualitative superiority. The tactical and technical data of the PE-2 TU-2 and IL-4 bombers and the YaK-3, YaK-9, YaK-7b and La-7 fighters greatly surpassed the Japanese SB-96 and SB-97 bombers and the I-97 fighter. As for the Soviet IL-2 and IL-10 ground attack planes, they had no equal in the world.

Moving under their own power from the Western Theater of Operations to the Far East were the VI Long-Range Bomber Air Corps (commander, Maj Gen Avn I. P. Skok), the VII Bomber Air Corps (commander, Lt Gen Avn V. A. Ushakov), the 54th Bomber Air Division (commander, Maj Gen Avn V. A. Shchelkin), the 21st Guards Air Transport Division (commander, Maj Gen Avn A. M. Gorskiy) while the personnel of the 190th Fighter Air Division (commander, Col V. V. Fokin) traveled by train without their equipment. These formations which had fought in the war against Nazi Germany strengthened the air armies of the Transbaykal and First Far Eastern Fronts as they were to be given the main role in the forthcoming operation.

[Question] Please tell us about the training of the personnel in the air armies for the operation.



[Answer] The Air Forces personnel in the Far East during the Great Patriotic War continued to improve their combat skills and they studied and introduced the enormous combat experience of the Soviet flyers who participated in the operations to defeat the Nazi Army. The leadership right up to the commanders of air regiments and a certain portion of the subunit commanders and staff officers did tours of duty in the air units and formations on the Soviet-German Front.

In preparing for combat the crews worked out piloting techniques on new equipment and group flying performing practice bombing and firing. For 3 months before the start of the operation the pilots flew more time than in any previous year of their assignment in the Far East.

The training of the staffs and the command personnel of the units and formations of the air armies was carried out by holding assemblies for the leadership, demonstration tactical flight exercises, exercises and games for the command personnel and air staffs with the ground forces and joint exercises for the ground troops and aviation in a situation close to actual combat.

Unfortunately, in individual formations of the 12th Air Army, instead of integrated training there was a predominance of assemblies and meetings and this subsequently led to serious shortcomings in the employment of aviation on mountain-desert terrain.

[Question] How was the Far Eastern Theater of Operations prepared in airfield and navigation terms?

[Answer] Great importance was given to equipping the Far Eastern Theater in airfield terms. In the 12th Air Army over 50 percent of the airfields were brought as close as possible to the frontier as it was considered that the broad fieldless strip of the Greater Khingan Range lay ahead and aviation would have to operate precisely from these airfields. In the 10th Air Army chief attention in preparing the airfield network was given to the Sungari sector. The 9th Air Army was in the best situation. This was explained by the significantly narrower zone of advance for the front and by the presence of an airfield network which made it possible to establish an air grouping in accord with the overall plan of the operation.

A system of checkpoint identification signs was established by the personnel of the air and all-arms units to ensure navigation and cooperation with the ground troops. These were Arabic numerals made from available materials and laid out on the peaks of hills 3-6 km from the frontier and 50-60 km apart. The most important roads were marked with large letters of the alphabet also made from available materials.

By the start of the operation equipment for ground support of aircraft navigation had been moved up to the forward airfields. Radio direction finders and nondirectional beacons were set up in the fighter basing areas, radio beacons in the bomber basing areas and light beacons in the base areas of the IL-4 night bombers, on the routes of their flights, at the base airfields and at the identification and checkpoint posts. Leader pilots were



assigned from the units which had been permanently stationed in the Far East to the regiments which had arrived from the West.

[Question] What was characteristic in the setting of missions and in the planning of combat operations for aviation?

[Answer] As a whole, the setting of missions and the content of the air combat plans differed little from the setting of missions and plans for offensive operations conducted by Soviet troops in the Western Theater of Operations. In the Manchurian Operation our aviation was given the missions of winning air supremacy, covering the troop groupings of the fronts, supporting the ground forces in breaking through the defenses and in actions in the operational depth, thwarting the maneuvering of enemy operational reserves, disrupting rail movements and troop command and the conducting of air reconnaissance.

Combat operations of the 10th Air Army were planned only for the first day of the operation. The situation was different in the 12th and 9th Air Armies. In the 12th Air Army, planning was for the first 5 days and in the 9th Air Army for 18 days of which the preparatory period was 5-7 days and the period of destroying defensive works was 1 day.

Detailed planning in the 12th Air Army was determined by the pending combat operations in the mountain-desert terrain and in the 9th Air Army by the presence of fortified areas.

Certain flaws in planning must also be pointed out. As an example, let us take the 12 Air Army. While the interests of the ground forces fighting on the separate operational sector necessitated the allocating of ground attack and fighter aviation for these sectors, it cannot be said that such a necessity arose for distributing the two bomber corps equipped with TU-2 aircraft. The basing of these corps as well as the range of the aircraft made it possible to employ them on a centralized basis.

In the plan for the combat employment of aviation in the 12th Air Army no provision was made for alternate airfields. This impeded air support for the 6th Guards Tank Army in its operations in the operational depth.

[Question] How was air reconnaissance carried out in preparing and conducting the Manchurian Operation?

[Answer] The conditions of peaceful relations with Japan did not make it possible to fully utilize this powerful and reliable source of information, since Soviet pilots were categorically prohibited from violating the state frontier. The most that the reconnaissance pilots could do without violating the state frontier was to carry out oblique air photography over a comparatively small territory of the border regions. For this reason the task of discovering the entire tactical and operational depth of enemy defenses rested on aviation during the first day of the offensive. With the start of hostilities, tactical reconnaissance was carried out by the ground attack planes and fighters to a depth up to 150 km, operational reconnaissance by the

front [tactical] bombers to 350-450 km while strategic reconnaissance was carried out by the long-range bombers to 600-700 km.

Reconnaissance was carried out by sectors and areas (zones) along a broad front (to 1,500 km). Here various methods were employed, the chief ones being aerial photography and visual observation. As a whole, up to 33 percent of the aircraft sorties was spent on conducting air reconnaissance in the Manchurian Operation, that is, 2- or 3-fold more than in the strategic offensive operations conducted by our troops in the Western Theater of Operations.

[Question] Did the Soviet Command know before the start of the operation that the Japanese had moved their aviation?

[Answer] This was not known to the Soviet Command prior to the start of the operation. Ch Mar Avn A. A. Novikov in his memoirs published in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1975, wrote: "On 9 August, enemy aviation for some reason was idle. I ordered Mar Avn S. A. Khudyakov to ascertain whether it had been moved to other, more distant airfields. Several hours later, S. A. Khudyakov phoned me saying that in essence there were no Japanese aircraft in Manchuria, not counting individual aircraft at airfields in Harbin, Changchun, Mukden and Dairen."

Where had Japanese aviation disappeared and why? The General Staff of the Japanese Army had decided to protect its air forces from inevitable loss and ordered the aviation to be moved to airfields in South Korea and Japan. They were rescuing not so much obsolete aircraft as flight personnel.

[Question] Please tell us about the aims and particular features of airborne troop landings.

[Answer] The airborne landing of troops in the Manchurian Operation was carried out, in the first place, only in its concluding stage and, secondly, was carried out chiefly by the landing method.

Since the transport aircraft of those times (LI-2 and S-47) had an insignificant load capacity, the number of airborne forces landed at the airfields of Manchuria, the Liaodung Peninsula and in North Korea was from 50 to 500 men and on Southern Sakhalin and Iturup Island even less, from 35 to 120 men.

After the mass surrendering of the formations of the 5th Japanese Army, the Soviet Command decided on 15 August to land the first airborne force (120 men) in Harbin with the mission of transmitting the surrender conditions to the Japanese Command, capturing all major objects in Harbin before the approach of our troops and preventing the destruction of the bridges on the Sungari River. On the following day, 19 August, 158 men were additionally landed in this area and on 20 August, 213 men. Although the Japanese Command was inclined to surrender, the risk was still great as in Harbin there was a large enemy garrison (more than 43,000 men) which could go over to active combat.

The Commander of the 9th Air Army, Col Gen Avn I. M. Sokolov kept the aviation ready for bombing and ground attack operations in the event that there would be a clash in Harbin between the landing troops and the Japanese units. But everything went well. The surrender conditions were accepted.

Airborne forces also landed in Changchun (500 men), Shenyang (225 men), Girin (200 men), Lushung (200 men), Luda (250 men) and Yanzi (238 men). The forward detachments of the ground troops immediately moved up to these cities behind the landing forces.

Sent out along with the airborne landing troops were specially assigned air representatives who in the event of necessity could provide target designation and guidance for the aviation. Our fighter and bomber aviation patrolled constantly over the landing airfields, ready at any minute to support the landing troops from the air.

[Question] In the press, including in our journal, it has been repeatedly published that in the Manchurian Operation out of the total number of losses in the air armies of the fronts, 37 percent was noncombat losses. What explains this?

[Answer] I must confess that the question of losses at one time also concerned me. We carefully analyzed this and reached the conclusion that the relative high percentage of high combat losses in our air units was explained by a number of factors, the main ones being: the excessively complicated geographic and climatic conditions which impeded air flights (torrential rains, fog, thunderstorms, low cloudiness, the desert and mountain-wooded terrain and the limited number of well designated markers); a poor knowledge of the particular features of the theater on the part of the crews arriving from the Western Theater of Operations; the remoteness of the base airfields, particularly in the 12th Air Army

[Question] What factors, in your opinion, influenced the operational success of employing the Air Forces in the Manchurian Operation?

[Answer] There were several such factors. Let me try to list the main ones.

In the first place, the establishing of overall supremacy in forces on the crucial sectors and unchallenged supremacy in the air for our aviation.

Secondly, the employment of large air forces which was a surprise for the enemy.

Thirdly, the underestimating of the might of the Soviet Air Forces in the Far East on the part of the Japanese Army General Staff.

Fourthly, continuous air actions against the enemy with the strict allocating of missions between the branches of aviation. The ground attack planes provided direct support for the advancing units and formations. The fighters initially covered their own troops but, without encountering serious enemy resistance in the air, switched to actions against ground targets. An exception was the 10th Air Army, where the fighters continued to cover the

front's troops up to the end of the war, although, in my view, there was no need for this. The bombers chiefly disrupted enemy operational movements and did not allow the shifting of reserves from the rear. As a result the Japanese Command was unable to maneuver the large formations and the combat areas were sealed off from the influx of fresh forces. Moreover, the enemy was unable to evacuate materiel from the border area and pull back its troops from under the attacks of the advancing Soviet troops.

Fifthly, the successful employment of one of the main properties of aviation, its high mobility. This was particularly apparent in the operation of the First Far Eastern Front, where the bomber and partially the ground attack aviation was shifted from supporting one army fighting on the left wing of the front to supporting another fighting on its right wing, and vice versa. This rapid concentration of significant air forces for attacking major objectives ensured a rapid rate of advance for the ground forces. The same thing can be said about the delivery of fuel and other materiel by the two air transport divisions to the 6th Tank Army which was crossing the Greater Khingan Range.

[Question] Comrade Marshal Aviation, in concluding the talk would you like to wish the journal's readers anything?

[Answer] I would like to say to the audience that they, having celebrated Victory Day over imperialist Japan, should not hurry in turning over to the archives the materials on the employment of the Air Forces in the Manchurian Operation, considering it 40 years old, but, on the contrary, carefully study these materials. A knowledge of history has always helped to bring out all the best and to avoid mistakes and errors committed. With good reason the ancients said that history is the mother of modern times.

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## COMBAT EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN MANCHURIAN OPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 85 (signed to press 23 Jul 85) pp 25-28

[Article by Col Gen V. M. Mikhalkin]

[Text] The organization and conduct of combat by artillery in the Manchurian Operation on each of the fronts were carried out depending upon the overall plan of the commanders, the quantitative and qualitative composition of the artillery as well as upon the nature of enemy defenses and the terrain. Thus, by the start of the offensive the First Far Eastern Front which was to launch the main attack in an area with strong enemy defensive works received the largest amount of artillery as reinforcements. It had over 10,600 guns and mortars. The Transbaykal Front also had around 9,000 guns and mortars and it, like the First Far Eastern Front, was to carry out the main mission in the operation. The Second Far Eastern Front which was to fight on an auxiliary sector possessed less than 4,800 guns and mortars although the area where its troops were deployed exceeded by more than 3-fold the zone of advance of the First Far Eastern Front.(1)

The artillery was allocated differently between the armies in the fronts. Thus, on the First Far Eastern Front over 30 percent of all the artillery was concentrated in the zone of advance of the 5th Army which was to break through one of the strongest Japanese fortified areas, the Suigenhe (Pogranichnenskiy). The army had around 3,000 guns and mortars of 76-mm caliber and higher and more than 400 rocket launchers. In this field force, in the sector of the main thrust, an average artillery-mortar density was to be established of at least 180 barrels (in individual sectors up to 250 barrels) per kilometer of front, and on the auxiliary sector, at least 60.(2) On the Second Far Eastern Front, the 15th Army which was to launch the main attack received the greatest artillery reinforcement. Here on the main sector there were up to 100-150 guns and mortars per kilometer of breakthrough front.(3) On the Transbaykal Front, the largest number of guns and mortars was assigned to the 36th and 39th Armies, the formations of which were to fight for the Halun-Arshan, Zhalaynor-Manchurian and Hailar Fortified Areas.(4)

The artillery grouping in the field forces of the fronts was established considering the situation in which they were to fight. Thus, on the

Transbaykal Front in the zone of which the enemy had pulled back its troops to a significant distance from the state frontier, leaving small forces in the border area, artillery groups in the units and formations (with the exception of the 36th Army) were not established. All ground and antiaircraft artillery (on all sectors, with the exception of the Hailar) was allocated to the columns of the all-arms and mobile formations. Here great attention was given to supporting the actions of the forward detachments and these included a significant number of guns and mortars. In the 36th Army, the artillery of the rifle regiments and separate antitank artillery battalions during the period of crossing the Argun River was assigned for direct laying in the crossing areas. The remaining artillery was positioned in indirect firing positions in full readiness to open fire. Each landing battalion was reinforced by artillery and mortar battalions.(5)

In the 35th Army of the Far Eastern Front, two army artillery groups were established: one for supporting the actions of the troops fighting on the sector of the main thrust and the other for covering the rail lines in the Iman Area and for destroying the DOS [pillboxes] of the Hutou Fortified Area. The second group was split into two subgroups: counterbattery bombardment and artillery carrying out the initial massed strike.(6)

On the Second Far Eastern Front, the troops of which were to advance under conditions of very difficult terrain and greatly limited opportunities for maneuvering the artillery from one sector to another, artillery groups were established in each army and division from the separate cannon, howitzer and antitank regiments and the rocket artillery battalions.

The planning of artillery actions on the First Far Eastern Front, the troops of which were to break through the heavily reinforced and deeply echeloned enemy defenses under conditions of difficult terrain, had its own particular features. Thus, in the 5th Army which was to play the main role in the front operation and was to advance in an area with strong enemy fortified areas, the plan for the artillery offensive included five periods. The mission of the first was the preliminary destruction of the enemy permanent installations using the forces of the artillery group for the initial massed attack on the day preceding the start of the operation. Then followed periods of supporting the actions of the forward battalions during the night prior to the offensive and lasting 1.5 hours, artillery softening up lasting 4 hours, support for the attack with a single rolling barrage combined with a PSO [successive concentration of fire] and the period of supporting the troops in combat deep in the enemy defenses. In the 35th Army, the troops of which were to cross the Sungach River and then take the Hutou Fortified Area, the artillery offensive was planned differently. Initially there was to be a 55-minute artillery softening up and then for an hour the artillery was to support the crossing of the river by the troops and support the attack and during the next 6-8 hours, support the infantry and tanks in their advance deep into the enemy defenses.(7)

In planning the artillery offensive on the Second Far Eastern Front, it was considered that the main content here would be supporting the crossing of the Amur and Ussuri and fire support for the troops during the period of the fight for the beachheads on the opposite banks of these rivers.

In the course of the operation, characteristic traits became apparent in the employment of artillery. First of all, it must be pointed out that on a number of sectors, due to the hurried abandonment of the first defensive line by the enemy, there was no need to carry out artillery softening up and support the attack on the planned scale.

The organization of artillery command was also diverse. Thus, on the Transbaykal Front its command and control were decentralized. As a rule, a significant part of the artillery was attached to the rifle and tank formations advancing along individual axes. On the maritime sector of the First Far Eastern Front at the start of the operation, the use of artillery was characterized by a high degree of its centralization in the hands of the army commanders in the aim of massing it in the course of breaking through the fortified areas. After the destruction of the defensive works, the basic mass of guns and mortars was turned over to the units and formations and supported their advance along the axes under the difficult conditions of mountain tayga. On the Amur sector, a particular feature in organizing the command of artillery was that after supporting the crossing of the water obstacles, the artillery formations and units which had made up the army artillery groups were turned over to the divisions and fought on the axes of their advance.(8)

A distinguishing feature in the employment of artillery in the course of the Manchurian Operation was also that in pursuing the enemy under the conditions of the mountain-tayga and swampy terrain, the leading place was given to the light, mountain and antitank artillery, to mortars and rocket launchers. Due to their mobility and maneuverability, such artillery could move along with the infantry and tanks and was the basic means of fire support for their operations.

In the course of the operation, important significance was given to the shifting of artillery. Thus with the fording of rivers on the opposite bank tractors remained on duty ready to tow out the vehicles which had bogged down in the crossing. For moving artillery across the swamps, extensive use was made of previously prepared planks, fascines and mats. Previously established artillery commandant posts played a major role in moving the heavy artillery systems across the passes. At each of these there were tractors as well as specially organized teams of soldiers with ropes and tows.(9)

In conclusion it must be said that in carrying out the Manchurian Operation, Soviet artillery played an exceptionally important role. Being the main fire force, it provided an opportunity to rapidly break through and crush the Japanese troop defenses. Under the conditions of the mountain-tayga terrain, artillery was the main means of troop fire support in pursuing the enemy.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 11, 1980, p 204.
2. Ibid., p 205.

3. L. N. Vnotchenko, "Pobeda na Dalnem Vostoke" [Victory in the Far East], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1971, p 111.
4. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 11, p 205; L. N. Vnotchenko, op. cit., p 104.
5. "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol IV, 1959, p 654.
6. "Sovetskaya artilleriya v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [Soviet Artillery in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1960, p 718.
7. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 234, inv. 220202, file 1, sheet 226.
8. "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva" [The History of Military Art], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, pp 351-352.
9. "Sovetskaya artilleriya v Velikoy...", pp 720-721.

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CSO: 1801/33



## ENGINEER SUPPORT OF THE OFFENSIVE IN THE MANCHURIAN OPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 85 (signed to press 23 Jul 85) pp 29-32

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Col Gen (Ret) A. F. Khrenov; during the period of the Manchurian Operation, A. F. Khrenov was the chief of engineer troops of the First Far Eastern Front]

[Text] The combat of the Soviet troops in the Far Eastern Theater of Operations involved the crossing of mountain passes, steep ascents and descents, the moving across rugged, swampy, tayga and desert-steppe terrain, the crossing of broad rivers and the overcoming of numerous enemy fortified areas. Under these conditions, engineer support for the offensive included the organization and conduct of engineer reconnaissance, the preparation of the assembly areas for the offensive, troop camouflage and the supply of water, the construction and repair of roads, the throwing up of crossings and participation in breaking through the fortified areas. The engineer troops were given the responsible tasks of supporting the rapid advance of the troops from three fronts. For carrying out this task, the fronts were reinforced with 18 combat engineer and pontoon-bridge brigades and 30 units of different engineer troops.(1) Here the First Far Eastern and Transbaykal Fronts received seven brigades each while the Second Far Eastern received four.

Considering the impassability of the terrain, the Soviet Command gave particular importance to organizing and conducting engineer reconnaissance. Its aim was to obtain data on the state of the road network and the passability of the terrain in the area of forthcoming combat, to study the water conditions in the major water obstacles and determine the most suitable areas for crossing them, and ascertaining camouflage capacity of the designated assembly areas for the offensive, the covered routes from them to the forward edge and water sources for organizing troop water supply. Careful study was also made of the enemy defenses. Engineer reconnaissance and the reconnaissance subunits of the units and formations determined the degree of engineer equipping of the forefield and the configuration of the forward edge and ascertain the positions and types of defensive works and obstacles both on the forward edge and deep in the defenses.

Due to the fact that prior to the summer of 1945, engineer organization of the terrain in the border areas of the Soviet Far East had had a purely defensive

nature, with the obtaining of the directive to conduct the operation, the engineer troops, particularly of the First Far Eastern Front, had to carry out a large amount of work to equip the assembly areas for the offensive. In the area of this front, a clearing was built up to 20 m wide and running along the state frontier and used for the forward subunits as a zone of surveillance and fire. This connected the radial roads running to it from the rear.

The scale of engineer tasks which were carried out in preparing the assembly areas on the First Far Eastern Front can be judged from the fact that just in the area of the 1st Red Banner Army some 540 km of roads and column tracks, 1,509 linear m of bridges, 100 pillboxes, 184 shelters, dugouts and shelter trenches, 3,859 firing positions for artillery and mortars and 209 command posts were built, 546 km of roads and 1,873 linear m of bridges were repaired, 832 km of trenches and communications trenches were dug and 161 km of wire obstacles were laid.(2)

A large amount of engineer work in outfitting the assembly areas for the offensive was also carried out in the area of the Second Far Eastern Front. Its engineer troops built 366 km of new roads (including 147 km with a gravel surface) and improved 1,417 km of already existing roads.(3)

On the Transbaykal Front, the troops of which were concentrated chiefly in open desert-steppe terrain, where the problem of preparing roads was less acute, the most important questions of engineer support were water supply and the camouflaging of the units and formations both in moving up to their concentration areas as well as in remaining in them. Over the period from 10 July through 8 August 1945, the engineer troops of the fronts and the non-T/O water supply teams set up in all the units built 1,194 shaft wells and repaired 122, as well as set up 61 water supply points. On the routes of the troop movements, wells were built every 15-30 km. A commandant service was organized at the drinking stations. Strict water rationing was established by orders of the army and formation commanders.(4)

Some 16,248 camouflage nets, 1,404 tank shelters, 250 camouflage mats and other regulation equipment were employed for camouflaging the troops of this front in the concentration areas.(5) The materiel covered by camouflage nets was positioned in excavations which were dug on the back slopes of hills. As for the laying of column tracks by the engineer troops of the Transbaykal Front in the concentration areas, this consisted basically in designating roads on the terrain by earth mounds up to 1 m high and which were located every 200-250 m.

One should also note the experience of the combat employment of engineer troops for carrying out different tasks in the period of conducting the Manchurian Operation. Thus, a particular feature of engineer reconnaissance in the course of the offensive was that this was conducted by reconnaissance groups and detachments which crossed the front line at places between the enemy strongpoints and centers of resistance or were air-dropped into the enemy rear. During combat the mobile engineer observation posts played an important role.

For the troops of all the fronts a difficult task was the breaking through of

the enemy fortified areas which covered the basic operational axes. For carrying this out special units were assigned. Thus, engineer support for the assault on the Hailar Fortified Area as conducted by troops of the 36th Army of the Transbaykal Front was entrusted to the 68th Army Combat Engineer Brigade and the combat engineer subunits of the 94th and 293d Rifle Divisions. In addition, in the period of preparing for the operation, assault groupings were established in the formations of each army and underwent special training.

An equally important mission, particularly under the conditions of the mountain-tayga terrain, was to support the advance of the advancing troops and formations. The most difficult for the engineer troops were the conditions in the area of the 1st Red Banner Army of the First Far Eastern Front, which was to cross an area of mountain tayga some 20 km deep. On the axis of the main thrust, the routes were laid in the following manner. At the head of the divisional column moved the forward detachment comprised of a rifle battalion, five tanks, two submachine gunner companies and a divisional platoon of combat engineers. Here two tanks which followed behind the reconnaissance traveled in an echelon in the tayga thickets laying a column track 5 m wide. The remaining three combat vehicles were in reserve for relieving the head tanks or for moving ahead in the event of a change in the direction of the route. The combat engineers and riflemen freed the path from fallen trees. The further widening of the column track to 7 m, the building of a road for two-way traffic, the construction of corduroy roads and small bridges and the laning of pipe were carried out by four engineer battalions spread out to the entire depth of the column from the point of vanguard to the rear units of the main forces.(6)

In other armies of the front, or supporting the advance of the troops, road detachments were established. Thus, in the 5th Army every rifle regiment had a detachment consisting of a rifle battalion and one or two combat engineer platoons. In a divisional detachment there were combat engineer and rifle battalions and in a cord attachment there were two engineer battalions and in an army detachment, four engineer battalions, a pontoon battalion and a road battalion reinforced with motor transport.

Of significant interest is the experience of engineer support for the combat of the X Mechanized Corps of the First Far Eastern Front. The engineer and mining companies and combat engineer platoons supported the advance of the brigades and regiments and were not involved in carrying out other tasks. The corps engineer battalion operated by company: the first company carried out road and bridge tasks in the traffic support detachment of the corps, the second supported the advance of the rear services of the formation, the third escorted the second and third echelons of the corps and supported the movement of wheeled transport.(7)

The troops of the 15th Army commenced the crossing of the Amur River by capturing islands by the forward detachments which crossed on landing boats, pontoons and launches of the Red Banner Amur Naval Flotilla. For crossing the main forces of the field force across the river, three points of ferry and landing boat crossings were established. Each of these was served by a pontoon bridge battalion with N2P equipment. Moreover, at the first point



there were 25 small amphibious vehicles and 17 large ones and at the second 3/8 of the heavy pontoon bridge equipment, 2 deck barges with a cargo capacity of 300 tons, 60 small amphibious vehicles and 5 large ones, while at the third there was the N2P crossing equipment.(8)

The troops of the 36th Army of the Transbaykal Front crossed the Argun River under more difficult conditions. The problem was that the engineer troops had to lay column tracks across the entire swampy floodplain in order to reach this water barrier. Some 14 km of roads were built with panels and fascines and 170 linear m of bridges were constructed. At least 1 km of wheel treadways were laid in one crossing of the river floodplain.

The supply of personnel and equipment with water was a specific task for the engineer troops from the Transbaykal Front in the course of the offensive in the desert-steppe terrain until reaching the Greater Khingan Range. The engineer units fighting with the forward detachments carried out the work in such a manner that by the time the main forces approached fully equipped water supply points would be available. The subunits of the army and front engineer brigades built wells along the troop routes while the divisional combat engineer battalions carried out the work of supplying water to the units during stops and the day halts. The non-T/O field water supply teams from the rifle regiments traveled with their units and were concerned with the transporting and distributing of water and also helped equip water sources.

The basic water supply points of the rifle divisions were located 25-30 km apart and for the tank and mechanized formations a distance of 70-75 km apart. Individual wells were built as supplementary water sources between the water supply points. Each formation was provided with a daily transportable supply of water.

One must separately mention the tasks which were carried out by the engineer troops of the Transbaykal Front in supporting the movement over the Greater Khingan. In the forward detachments of the formations from the 6th Guards Tank Army there were at least 4 combat engineer platoons which were to conduct reconnaissance and lay the route. Behind them followed subunits which, as a rule, included a combat engineer company with the task of clearing mines from the roads and water sources. A combat engineer battalion traveled with the head tank brigade and it equipped the routes for the main forces of the corps. The main forces of a tank (mechanized) corps included up to two engineer battalions with crossing equipment. For building army roads the engineer forces were distributed in such a manner that there was at least one engineer battalion per route. An army engineer reserve was also established. But even with such an allocation of the army engineer troops, the difficulties were significant. The combat engineers had to strengthen the swampy and broken up areas of roads, fill in holes, build corduroy roads and lay brush. They also had to lay routes on slopes, they built and repaired bridges, they established fords and so forth.

In conclusion, it must be pointed out that in the actions of the engineer troops which participated in the Manchurian Operation extensive use was made of the experience of the war against Nazi Germany and this proved completely effective under the specific conditions of the Far Eastern Theater of



Operations. At the same time, there were also particular features here in organizing the crossing of rivers with broad swampy floodplains, in water supply for the troops in the desert-steppe terrain and in the crossing of mountain ranges with the lack of a developed road network.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 11, 1980, p 207; L. N. Vnotchenko, "Pobeda na Dalnem Vostoke" [Victory in the Far East], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1971, p 126.
2. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 11, p 207.
3. "Inzhenernyye voyska v boyakh za Sovetskuyu Rodinu" [Engineer Troops in Battles for the Soviet Motherland], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1973, p 341.
4. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 11, p 207.
5. "Inzhenernyye voyska v boyakh...", p 342.
6. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 69, inv. 383810, file 1, sheet 60.
7. L. N. Vnotchenko, op. cit., p 354.
8. TsAMO, folio 69, inv. 383810, file 1, sheet 145.

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CSO: 1801/33

## SIGNALS IN THE MANCHURIAN OPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 85 (signed to press 23 Jul 85) pp 33-36

[Article by Lt Gen V. I. Sokolov]

[Text] The offensive by the Soviet troops in the Far East was preceded by extensive work in preparing and deploying the means of communications. An extensive network of wire communications was established and supplies of accessories and operating materials were prepared. The Special Purpose Communications Center USON-34 was organized to ensure communications between the General Staff and the Staff of the Transbaykal Front and the USON-70 for the staffs of both Far Eastern fronts. It must be pointed out that the USON set up in the Far East in terms of the nature of organization and methods of use differed somewhat from those operated on the Soviet-German Front. Their networks made extensive use of powerful stationary radio equipment of the People's Commissariat of Communications. This substantially improved the stability of communications of the General Staff with the fronts and the armies.

In comparison with the Soviet-German Front the scale of work in setting up the network of wire communications in the initial position for the offensive in the Far Eastern Theater of Operations was significantly greater. Thus, by July 1945, the Signal Troops of the Transbaykal Front (signals chief, Lt Gen Sig Trps P. D. Miroshnikov) had built 586 km of new permanent overhead communications lines and had equipped three communications centers for the staff of the front and 14 inspection and testing points on the communications lines.(1) The signal troops of the First Far Eastern Front (signals chief, Lt Gen Sig Trps D. M. Dobykin), in preparing for the Manchurian Operation, concentrated their efforts on building the wire communications links to the armies and individual formations. They prepared two and more links for each army and established over 50 auxiliary communications centers and inspection-texting points.(2) All these measures were carried out secretly with the basic amount of work being done, as a rule, at night.

The radio equipment was also prepared carefully for the offensive. Considering the great scope and high rate of advance for the forthcoming front offensive operations, important significance was given to mobile communications equipment. A significant portion of the radios was mounted on

motor vehicles. The obsolete types (6PK, 5AK and others) were replaced by new(3) including the vehicle-mounted radios (RAF and RAT).


The personnel of the signals units prepared intensely to ensure communications under the difficult physicogeographic conditions of the Far East. The questions were worked out of direction finding in the desert, tayga and mountainous terrain, under roadless conditions and with an absence of landmarks. Special exercises were conducted at which the signal troops learned to lay cables over water obstacles.

The unique features of the Far Eastern Theater of Operations and the significant distances between command posts and their frequent moves demanded the use of mobile and flexible forms of troop command on the part of the command and the staffs and, consequently, the most acceptable methods of organizing communications to the entire depth of operations. The signals chiefs of all levels endeavored to make maximum and creative use of the enormous experience gained by our signal troops over the 4 years of war with Nazi Germany. Thus, Gen A. I. Leonov who was appointed signals chief of the Transbaykal Front in August 1945, in order to preserve the men and equipment for carrying out the tasks in the course of the operation, decided to provide wire communications with all the armies in the initial position from the command post while communications of the operations group of the front commander would be provided only with the front's command post and the armies fighting on the main sector.(4) With the start of the offensive it was planned to build one main artery of the front and three links for the armies. Here the permanent overhead lines for the armies were to run only to a depth of up to 150 km from the state frontier and subsequently local communications lines would be employed. In the course of combat it was discovered that there were no communications lines in the zone of the front before crossing the Greater Khingan. For this reason it was necessary for the front's signals troops to build wire lines.

Since the rate of advance of the Transbaykal Front in the course of the offensive was higher than planned, the need arose to make changes in the plan for organizing wire communications. In particular, they stopped building the wire communications links for the 6th Guards Tank Army, the 17th Army and the 15th Army and the Cavalry-Mechanized Group (KMG) of Gen I. A. Pliyev. Until these armies and the KMG had moved beyond the Greater Khingan, contact with them was provided only by radio and mobile communications facilities. However, the building of the axial wire line was continued.

In order to keep up with the advancing troops, the signal troops had to initially string an overhead line on poles. As the permanent overhead line was completed this was taken down and the released men and equipment were put in the reserve of the signals chief or used for further putting up the line. The high rate of advance of the Transbaykal Front necessitated the development of a new method for building the overhead pole lines. The route of the line was broken up into platoon sections. These were built simultaneously. This provided an opportunity to promptly organize line communications.

Difficult tasks also had to be carried out by the signal troops of the Far Eastern Front. However, their work was eased significantly by the fact that,



The Organization of Radio Communications in the 6th Guards Tank Army

- Key: 1--Command post of the 6th Guards Tank Army  
 2--Radio network of the Armored and Mechanized Troops of the Transbaykal Front  
 3--Radio network of the staff of the Transbaykal Front  
 4--Liaison radio network of the Transbaykal Front  
 5--Radio network of the Soviet Army Main Staff  
 6--Radio network of the commander of the Transbaykal Front  
 7--Liaison radio network of the 6th Guards Tank Army  
 8--Radio link of the Staff of the Transbaykal Front  
 9--Radio link of the Staff of the 6th Guards Tank Army

in contrast to the Transbaykal Front, in the area of the First Far Eastern Front there was a widely developed network of enemy telegraph and telephone lines and communications centers. The lateral and additional short communications lines which had been built made it possible to link the Soviet and Manchurian main lines into a single system and thereby provide the possibility of establishing communications over bypass links and maneuver the circuits and wires.

The signal troops of the Second Far Eastern Front did not have to reorganize communications in the assembly area, since the personnel of this field force had virtually not changed over the entire war. The signals chief of the front, Maj Gen Sig Trps A. F. Novinitskiy merely had to make adjustments and clarifications in the organization of communications in accord with the overall plan for the operation. A characteristic feature in providing line



communications for the troops of the Second Far Eastern Front was the fact that its signal troops had to build cable and overhead crossings across the Amur and Ussuri and provide communications in their crossing. The task was complicated by the torrential rains which started and caused great flooding by the rivers.

Under the conditions of the Far Eastern Theater of Operations and with the high rate of advance of the troops, radio communications played a crucial role. This was the basic means for controlling the troops in conducting the highly fluid combat.(5) Due to the great distance of the theater of operations from Moscow, radio contact of the fronts with the General Staff was provided by the RAT radios. Upon the orders of the Signals Chief of the High Command, Col Gen Sig Trps N. D. Psurtsev, all documents from the fronts addressed to the General Staff and the central directorates were to be transmitted via the signals center of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief in the Far East.

RAT radios with an Almaz attachment were employed for communications of the fronts and armies with the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief in the Far East. In the aim of increasing stability and capacity, radio contact with the armies was organized over the links using voice and printing modes.(6) For these purposes RAF radios were assigned to the army commanders.

The appropriate communications links were established to provide dependable communications with the 6th Guards Tank Army and the KMG of the Transbaykal Front which were to advance rapidly. The correctness of this decision was properly confirmed in the course of the operation as communications on these links operated without interruption.

To ensure continuous wireless communications with the rapid rate of advance and with the movement of command posts over great distances, all the staff radio equipment was divided into three positions. This made it possible to effectively shift the command posts to areas which had already been readied by the signal troops, it excluded the loss of communications in shifting command from one control post to another and also ensured the possibility of maneuvering radio equipment to strengthen individual communications centers or in opening additional radio links. We should also note the setting up on the Transbaykal Front of a radio center for organizing the re-receiving of immediate information from the 6th Guards Tank Army and the KMG.

It must be said that the radio networks established in the preparatory period with a large number of users were not sufficiently effective under the conditions of the rapid rate of advance and the rapidly changing situation. Their breaking up made it possible to reduce the time for handling radiograms, to provide maximum flexibility and maneuverability of wireless communications and reduce the time for transferring users to other frequencies.

A positive feature in the organization of communications in the Manchurian Operation was the broad use of mobile communications facilities. Transport aviation in a number of instances was used for transporting army and front communications centers to new positions of the command posts. Thus, the communications center of the 39th Army was moved from Taoyan to Mukden in just

two trips.(7) An analogous decision was taken in moving the basic part of the communications center for the staff of the Transbaykal Front from Wangyemao to Changchun (the position of the captured staff of the Kwantung Army), that is, over a distance of 440 km. In just 24 hours this center was already in operation at the new point. For ensuring communications on the Transbaykal Front captured equipment was rationally utilized (after learning to use it).

These were just some of the most characteristic features in the experience of organizing and providing communications in the Manchurian Operation. In judging the work of the signal troops as a whole, it must be pointed out that they fully carried out their tasks and provided uninterrupted troop command and this contributed to defeating the Japanese aggressors in Manchuria. The signals units which distinguished themselves in battle received honorific names and were awarded battle orders.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 210, inv. 3137, file 287, sheet 47.
2. Ibid., folio 71, inv. 466414, file 1, sheet 15.
3. "Voyennyye svyazisty v boyakh za Rodinu" [Signal Troops in the Battles for the Motherland], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, p 208.
4. Ibid., p 209
5. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 11, 1980, p 207.
6. "Voyennyye svyazisty v boyakh...", p 213.
7. TsAMO, folio 394, inv. 9072, file 379, sheet 117.

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## CERTAIN FEATURES OF REAR SUPPORT FOR THE FIRST FAR EASTERN FRONT IN THE MANCHURIAN OPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 85 (signed to press 23 Jul 85) pp 37-41

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences, Col V. S. Bichik]

[Text] In preparing for the Manchurian Strategic Operation, the organization of rear support for the troops comprised a difficult task. The stockpiling of materiel for the troops of the Far East started before the end of military operations against Nazi Germany and began to increase noticeably by the summer of 1945, particularly after the State Defense Committee on 3 June established the amount of supplies to be accumulated on the front by the start of the operation.

Immediate preparations of the rear for the Maritime Troop Grouping (from 5 August 1945, the First Far Eastern Front) for the offensive started after the receipt of the Directive of Hq SHC of 28 June 1945 for carrying out the operation.

Regardless of the extended preparatory period, due to the heavy load on the Trans-Siberian Main Line the front and army rear (with the exception of the 5th Army) had not been brought fully up to strength. There were not enough railroad units, hospitals, captured equipment services, receiving points and other units and facilities. In terms of motor vehicles, the troops and rear services on 1 August 1945 were only at 71 percent of full strength.(1)

Under the plan for the organization of the rear services and logistic support for the First Far Eastern Front (chief of the rear, Maj Gen I. K. Nikolayev), all armies were assigned railroad sections. Here the 35th Army was based on a section of the Trans-Siberian Main Line while the 25th Army considering its operations along two axes received two sections.

By the start of the operation the front had 754 rear units and facilities of the front and army level. In the course of the operation, these continued to be received from the Center and on 15 August there were already 833(2) not counting the rear units and facilities of the 9th Air Army and the Maritime Air Defense Army. There were 54 front-level dumps, including 11 artillery, 21

fuel, 5 food and 17 dumps for other types of materiel. Some 17 dumps were field and the remainder were permanent.(3)

Due to the particular geographic conditions in the theater of operations, a rear boundary for the front was not designated and the rear army boundary ran closer to the forward edge than it did in conducting operations in the West. For the 35th Army it ran 40-60 km to the east of the Trans-Siberian Main Line and for the remaining armies, along this main line, excluding it.

The numerous rear units and facilities, the presence of a large number of permanent dumps and depots as well as the particular geographic conditions and troop operations along separate axes **predetermined the particular features of the positioning of the rear services by the start of the operation and their movement in the course of combat.**

Men and weapons of the front rear were assigned for direct support of the first echelon armies. These were deployed in the rear areas of the armies on the railroad a distance of 40-60 km from the state frontier in two areas: the first for the 35th Army and the 1st Red Banner Army and the second for the 5th and 25th Armies.

The established rear groupings included head front dumps for ammunition, fuel and food as well as the most mobile forces and equipment for transport, medical and other types of support. For increasing the effort of the established rear groupings, more than 80 percent of the front dumps, the hospitals and other rear units and facilities were deployed a distance of 70-120 km from the state frontier on the Trans-Siberian Main Line and on a railroad spur running to the east from Manzovka Station in two areas.

A reserve was established for the front's rear and this included 3 motor vehicle regiments, 2 sided vehicle battalions,(4) 36 hospitals and other units and facilities. Particular attention was given to support of the front's mobile group (the X Mechanized Corps). It received 400 motor vehicles with materiel from the units under the front.(5)

The army rear facilities were organized analogously to the front rear. Here the departments of the army depots or the departments of the dumps in the course of the operation were brought closer to the troops. They were deployed either on the railroad (35th Army) or on the ground (1st Cavalry Army, 5th and 25th Armies). The units and facilities of the front rear which were attached to the armies played an exceptionally important role in supporting the troops during the operation. Each army was strengthened with a motor vehicle regiment or battalion, two-four road battalions,(6) one or two railroad medical teams and so forth.

**The availability of materiel for the troops of the front** by the start of the operation was as follows: 4.4 fuelings for aviation gasoline, 10.5 for gasoline and 6.6 for diesel fuel,(7) for all types of ammunition this was 3.2-9.8 units of fire, while there were from 29 to 91 daily rations of the various groups of food.(8) The consumption of materiel in the operation differed significantly from its consumption in the course of combat in the West. For example, the consumption of ammunition was insignificant. At the same time,



the high rate of advance and the movement of equipment over roadless terrain required an increased consumption of fuel which on individual days of the operation exceeded the norm by 3-4-fold.

The highly maneuverable troop operations and the shifting of efforts from one axis to another necessitated the transfer of units and formations from one army to another and this led to a significant change in the fuel consumption and the weight of fuelings in the armies during different periods of the operation. In the course of combat a portion of the consumed fuel was made up by supplies captured from the enemy and was also delivered by air. A significant role was played by the reserve fuel and transport available to the chief of the rear. At the start of the operation the units attempted to deliver fuel by their own forces. Thus, in the 35th Army, the personnel transported fuel a distance of 8-13 km across swampy terrain in cans. However, this did not produce the desired results. Then they began transporting fuel in 200-liter barrels on tanks but it turned out that one-half of the transported fuel was consumed by the tank itself. They also attempted to deliver fuel across swamps on pontoon sections pulled by tractors.

In conducting combat at a rapid pace, difficulties also arose in supplying the troops with baked bread. The field bakeries under such conditions were unable to move rapidly and bake bread. Local facilities for baking bread existed only in the major cities. The needs of the troops for bread were satisfied by dry biscuits and hard tack.

All types of transport, including maritime (to Korea) were used for delivering materiel in the course of the operation. However, the greatest load lay on motor transport. We should note the experience of delivering materiel from the front dumps "by transit" directly to the formations and even the units without transloading at intermediate rear units.

The unique geographic conditions and combat actions were also reflected in the **organizing of transport support**. The relatively developed railroad network in the Maritime Kray and Manchuria could be widely employed in the interests of supplying the troops. The plan for the location of the rear and logistical support of the front in the course of the operation envisaged the rebuilding of two rail routes: Rassypnaya Pad--Mudanchiang (the former Chinese Eastern Railroad) and Turiy Rog--Mudanchiang. The second route was to be rebuilt only after the arrival of additional railroad troops.

The road troops in the area of the front maintained nine front military roads (VAD) and two or three roads in each army.(9) As a consequence of the fact that not enough early reconnaissance of the roads was carried out, the link-ups of the VAD of the front with the enemy roads in the 1st Red Banner Army and 5th Army were not successfully chosen. As a result, in the course of the operation large gaps formed between the front and army sections of the served roads.(10) In the 5th Army, for example, the gaps reached 40-60 km. As a consequence of this, "stoppages" were formed on the army roads, the speed of vehicle travel declined sharply and proper traffic procedures were violated. It was decided to concentrate the efforts of the road sections on the most important routes. The directive for the rear services of the front of

27 August provided for the maintaining of only four front VAD (for each army) and one army VAD. For their rebuilding and up-keep, in addition to the road units, engineer and reserve units and formations as well as the local population were used.(11)

**The organization and implementation of medical support for the operation** were also very instructive. In the front and army medical facilities, by the start of the operation, there were 53,596 free beds. The experience of the war in the West showed that such hospital capacity would be insufficient. For this reason, it was planned to bring the number of beds up to 88,700. In the course of the operation the front continued to receive hospitals and by 25 August their capacity had increased to 74,600 beds.(12) Since the medical losses were insignificant, the available number of medical facilities was more than sufficient. A significant portion was not needed and remained undeployed up to the end of the operation.

We should also note the experience of utilizing the medical battalions of the divisions which in a number of instances remained behind the formations and assigned head sections from their personnel. The medical personnel of the latter with medicines and instruments followed the units closely and promptly provided the necessary aid to the wounded. Those requiring aid were delivered quickly to the medical stations of the regiments. Thus, in the 5th Army, out of the total number of stretcher cases, 93.7 percent were brought to the regimental medical stations in no later than 6 hours and this was a high indicator.(13) Many wounded were sent to the medical battalions of the divisions and the field mobile hospitals, bypassing the regimental medical stations.

Sick and wounded were evacuated by all types of transport. The medical teams and trains evacuated some 4,547 persons.(14) The front's medical directorate air-evacuated the severely wounded upon request of the armies. Sick and wounded were evacuated by sea from North Korea. In all the rear elements for evacuating wounded motor vehicle transport was widely used and on the troop level, cart transport.

In the 5th and 25th Armies, due to the bad sanitary and epidemiological state of the area, regardless of the measures initiated by the medical service, there were cases of infectious illnesses among the personnel. In order to prevent mass infection of the servicemen, it was prohibited to quarter troops located on Manchurian and Korean territory together with the indigenous population and preventive measures were also planned including vaccinating of the personnel, regular sanitary-epidemiological reconnaissance and the moving up of the sanitary-epidemic subunits behind the troops.(15)

**Significant work was carried out by the veterinary service** to prevent the carrying of such dangerous animal diseases as cattle plague, glanders and so forth into Soviet territory. Along the frontier special veterinary inspection stations were organized, special reconnaissance was carried out and there was close supervision of the movement of livestock.

**The security and defense of important installations in the rear area of the front** were provided by special security units and subunits according to a plan

worked out by the chief of rear security and air defense according to a plan of the deputy artillery commander for air defense. Security chiefs of the troop rear were appointed for directing security and defense of the rear in all the front's formations. At their disposal were troop subunits which in the course of the operation combed the terrain and eliminated the remaining enemy groups and saboteurs.

**For control and command of the front's rear**, under the conditions of the troops fighting along separate, isolated axes, extensive use was made of rear operations groups and mobile means of communications were employed more often than in the West. This was caused by the lack of local communications lines and the insufficient capacity of the available radios.

Rear support for the troops of the First Far Eastern Front in the Manchurian Operation, although being carried out under special conditions, still incorporated all that was valuable and obtained in the course of the war against Nazi Germany.

At the same time, under the conditions of the extremely uneven consumption of materiel and medical losses, the demands upon the autonomy of the rear services increased sharply. Rational allocation by axes and the echeloning of the rear support resources in depth as well as consideration and use of local resources and captured equipment assumed important significance. The role of the rear reserves as well as the comprehensive use of all types of transport increased particularly.

For ensuring dependable supply of the troops with materiel in the mountain-tayga and swampy terrain, the rear units and subunits, as experience was to show, should have means of transport which in terms of cross-country capability would be equal to that of combat equipment.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 67, inv. 12020, file 532, sheet 154.
2. Ibid., sheet 193.
3. Ibid., sheets 145-147.
4. Ibid., sheet 158.
5. Ibid., sheet 156.
6. Ibid., sheets 231-233.
7. Ibid., sheet 203.
8. "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol IV, 1959, pp 686, 688.

9. TsAMO, folio 67, inv. 12020, file 532, sheets 231, 232.
10. Ibid., sheet 182.
11. Ibid., sheets 242, 243.
12. Ibid., sheet 159.
13. Ibid., sheets 159, 160.
14. Ibid., sheet 100.
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CSO: 1801/33



## RAIL TRANSPORT IN PREPARATION, EXECUTION OF MANCHURIAN OPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 85 (signed to press 23 Jul 85) pp 42-46

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences, Col G. P. Germanov]

[Text] The need to quickly move a large amount of troops and supplies required the adopting of a number of measures aimed at increasing the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. In particular, on 13 April 1945, the GKO [State Defense Committee] adopted a decree on improving operations of the Far Eastern railroads.(1) The Special District of Far Eastern Railroads (chief, Deputy People's Commissar of Railroads, V. A. Garnyk) was established for improving the leadership over the five Far Eastern railroads, that is, the Eastern Siberian (chief, M. A. Nesterenko), Transbaykal (chief, I. A. Korchachenko), Amur (chief, Ye. I. Malginov), Far Eastern (chief, A. D. Bespyatyy) and Maritime (chief, A. F. Zhuravlev).

This decree made the People's Commissariat of Railroads (NKPS) responsible for bringing the passage of trains on the Novosibirsk--Vladivostok route by 1 May to 24 pairs a day and by 1 August, to 30 pairs a day, and on the Karymskaya--Otpor route, to 12 and 14 pairs, respectively. Some 800 steam locomotives were sent from the other main lines and from the NKPS reserve to the Far Eastern railroads for boosting the locomotive fleet.

The Special District of Far Eastern Railroads was staffed with persons having great experience on the front railroads. Thus, in the second quarter of 1945, the number of locomotive engineers increased by 2,373, assistant engineers by 2,916 and steam locomotive mechanics by 3,155 persons. All the special formations of the NKPS were returned to the Far East and which had previously been dispatched to the Southwestern railroads; three operations railroad regiments and three military operations sections arrived in April from Romania and Poland.(2) The 25th Railroad Brigade (zhdb) was sent to the Amur and Far Eastern railroads to increase the capacity of the Far Eastern railroads and the third zhdb was sent to the Maritime Railroad.(3) The shortage of railroad troops and special NKPS formations required the organization of around 80 different reconstruction trains and teams from civilian railroad workers on the Amur, Maritime and Far Eastern Railroads.

Leadership over the military railroad service on the Far Eastern railroads, upon the decision of the General Staff of 11 May, was concentrated in the newly organized Directorate of the Representative of the Central Military Railroads Directorate (TsUPVOSO). Gen A. V. Dobryakov became its chief. He was given the right to issue orders on organizing and handling military shipments and on the technical condition of the roads as follows: for the lines of the military railroads [VOSO] through the VOSO chiefs and the chiefs of troop movements and for the NKPS through the chief of the Special District of Far Eastern Railroads. The representative of the TsUPVOSO was to plan all types of troop movements and set the amounts of internal front traffic in accord with the requests of the fronts as well as exercise supervision over the loading, movement and unloading of the trains.

The double-track Irkutsk--Vladivostok Main Line was the only railroad providing movements for all three fronts, the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Naval Flotilla. The low capacity of the main line (on individual sections, 25 pairs of trains a day) caused the significant duration of troop movements related to preparations for the offensive operation. In order to successfully and promptly carry out the rail shipments, the GKO planned for the construction of an alternate rail bypass on the Irkutsk--Slyudyanka section to replace the slide area which included 53 tunnels and galleries along the coast of Baykal as well as the Irkutsk--Ulan-Ude motor road. In addition, there were plans to use Baykal as a water route in the event of the interruption of traffic on the railroad, to increase the railroad capacity by eliminating the "bottlenecks," to develop certain railroad junctions, including the stations of Borzya, Svobodnyy, Berezovskiy, Birobidzhan-2, Grodekovo and others, to increase the capacity of the water and coal supply stations and to organize the rapid replacement of rotten ties and worn out track.

For bypassing railroad bridges the construction workers built earthen approaches to the new bridge axis and constructed temporary wooden supports. In order to allow the troops to move on foot across the railroad bridges, wooden planking was laid on the bridge supports of the latter. Dirt tracks were brought up to the bridges. Certain railroad stations were equipped by the military railroad workers as regulating stations and railheads, having built additional track at them.

The strategic regrouping of the troops to the Far East required a great effort on the part of the railroad workers and military railroad service. As a total, 1,666 operational trains (84,902 cars) and 50,854 cars with supplies arrived in the Far East. The internal front shipments were also significant: 27,183 cars with operational freight and 65,584 cars with supplies.(4)

The transport support for the operational and supply shipments was not always carried out smoothly. Serious shortcomings were the extended hold-ups of the troop trains while waiting for a final assignment to destinations. At times the operational trains were stalled waiting for locomotives. This happened most frequently on the Amur Railroad where there were only 280 locomotives in the operating fleet instead of 350.

Difficulties arose in transporting logistic supplies basically due to the poor preparation of the front rear bodies to receive fuels and lubricants coming

under plans of the Center. The small tank capacity available to the rear services of the fronts and armies was quickly filled. After this, the emptying of fuel and lubricants from the railroad tank cars was halted on the fronts. By the start of the operation, more than 1,500 tank cars with fuel stood idle on the Far Eastern railroads. At the Bayan-Tumen Station alone, over 400 of them had piled up. This created a great strain in railroad operations.

The conditions for the basing of troops on the fronts in transport terms were the following. The double-track Irkutsk--Vladivostok Trans-Siberian Main Line remained at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Troops in the Far East. In all the main line junctions the fronts, within their areas, were permitted to have their own representatives for coordinating rail movements. Six single-track sections ran from the Trans-Siberian Main Line to the Soviet-Manchurian Frontier and the Second and First Far Eastern Fronts were based on these.

The First Far Eastern Front used on these routes eight railroad sections from 27 to 193 km long with a capacity from 11 to 17 pairs of trains a day and one narrow-gauge railroad with a capacity of 300 tons per day.<sup>(5)</sup> The Second Far Eastern Front was assigned nine railroad sections from 52 to 446 km long with a capacity from 6 to 24 pairs of trains a day and two narrow-gauge railroads with a capacity of 600 and 400 tons a day. The regulating stations of the First Far Eastern Front were the stations of Guberovo and Voroshilov (Ussuriysk) with a division at Manzovka Station and for the Second Far Eastern Front the Svobodnyy Station with a division at Khabarovsk-2 Station.

The transport conditions for troops of the First and Second Far Eastern Fronts were good: the front dumps were basically located on the railroad sections assigned to the fronts. The 35th Army had a section on the railroad of the Center (Guberovo, Yevgenyevka) with two railheads (Shmakovka, Lazo).<sup>(6)</sup> Each army, with the exception of the 16th, received its railroad section with several railheads.

The Transbaykal Front in terms of transport support had more difficult conditions. For basing the front was assigned 12 railroad sections with a capacity of 18 pairs of trains a day. Borzya Station served as the front's regulating station with a division at Bayan-Tumen Station. The basic artery was the single-track line of Karymskaya--Borzya--Bayan-Tumen. Here the Borzya--Bayan-Tumen section had a capacity of just 7 pairs of trains a day. The front's railroad troops with the aid of the Transbaykal Railroad in June 1945 on this section built 13 sidings and this made it possible to increase the road's capacity up to 18 pairs of trains a day. At the link-up of the normal and narrow gauges (Bayan-Tumen) a circular track system was built (30 km). It fully handled the transloading of freight to the narrow-gauge railroad and motor transport. From here materiel over the narrow-gauge Bayan-Tumen--Tamsak-Bulak line was delivered to the three field front dumps. A portion of the front dumps was based on the Karymskaya--Borzya, Ulan-Ude--Chita--Darasun--Dolina--Chelutay Railroads. Only the 36th Army had its own narrow gauge Kharanor, Dosatuiy Railroad and the railheads of Kharanor, Dosatuy, Matsiyevskaya. In June-August, the average daily traffic loads on these narrow-gauge railroads were, respectively, 82 and 37 cars a day.



In line with the limited capacity of the Karymskaya--Bayan-Tumen route, a decision was taken to unload a portion of the trains arriving for the Transbaykal Front in the area of Karymskaya Station and move the troops by foot to the concentration areas. The VOSO bodies began preparing to unload the trains the moment they arrived at Irkutsk Station.

Since a significant number of the front field dumps was located on the Irkutsk--Vladivostok Main Line which was under the High Command of the Soviet Troops in the Far East while the front regulating stations of the First and Second Far Eastern Fronts (Svobodnyy and Guberovo) were based on the same main line but not at the link-up points of the front railroad sections to it, the internal front shipments had to be made over railroad sections which were not part of the front railroad network. This significantly complicated the rear services of the fronts.

The plan for the organization of the rear and logistic support for the Transbaykal and First Far Eastern Fronts in the course of the operation envisaged, for example, the reconstruction and adaptation of sections of the former Chinese Eastern Railroad (KVZhD) to the Soviet gauge.

Prior to the start of the operation the staff of the First Far Eastern Front learned that the Japanese were preparing to blow up the railroad tunnels which were close to our frontier. By this they planned to hold up the reconstruction of the KVZhD for an extended time. In order not to allow this, the Command of the 3d Railroad Brigade prepared special "snatch" groups. During the night of 9 August, when our troops crossed the frontier, the groups secretly made their way to the tunnels, removed the sentries, cut the wire to the charges and organized a defense. From the tunnels the combat engineers removed more than 8 tons of explosive and around 40 mines.(7)

The pace of adapting the railroad to the Soviet gauge on the First Far Eastern Front averaged 71 km a day.(8) This was achieved due to the resourcefulness of the railroad workers. They were included in the airborne forces and forward detachments. They seized railroad junctions and with the aid of the local population immediately organized the adjusting of the gauge and the repair of the track. The railroad troops carried out great work in rebuilding destroyed installations. Just from 10 August through 30 September 1945, they returned to operation around 100 railroad bridges (6,000 linear m), 5 tunnels, 987 km of station track, 54 water supply stations, 3,770 switch sets and replaced 485,000 ties and 3,166 lengths of track.(9)

There were certain particular features in organizing and carrying out shipments over the Manchurian railroads. Thus, on a number of routes isolated railroad sections were employed. For example, the VOSO section of the 36th Army (VOSO chief, Col Ya. S. Kosmynin) with the aid of Chinese railroad workers organized three shuttle trains of 30 cars each and moved troops and freight over the Tsitsikar--Harbin--Changchun section. Shuttle trains were used immediately behind the army troops and provided them with great aid. For organizing the shipment of the 39th Army (VOSO chief, Col I. V. Ovchinnikov), they also used an isolated railroad section of Taonan--Port Arthur.



On the Second Far Eastern Front, isolated railroad sections in individual instances were used for operational shipments in the aim of bypassing a destroyed motor road. Due to the fact that only the main line of the KVZhD from the station of Manchuria to Pogranichnaya Station (a length of 1,481 km) had been adapted to the Soviet gauge in Manchuria, it was essential to organize transloading areas at three railroad junctions of Tsitsikar, Harbin and Mudanchiang.

For supplying coal to the steam locomotives, upon the initiative of the VOSO bodies of the fronts, mining was resumed at the Fushun and other pits. The VOSO directorates of the fronts paid the wages of the Chinese workers upon the instructions of the military councils of the fronts. This measure was carried out most successfully on the Transbaykal Front (VOSO chief, Col A. G. Sushchenko).

The railroad troops and the special NKPS formations during the preparatory period for the operation did enormous work to increase the capacity of the Far Eastern Railroads. As a result, the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Main Line was brought up to 30 pairs of trains a day and the Karymskaya--Otpor Railroad to 18 pairs a day. Regardless of the significant difficulties, rail transport in the stipulated, relatively short time transported large numbers of troops, combat equipment and supplies a distance of 9,000-11,000 km over the sole Trans-Siberian Main Line.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 11, 1980, p 188.
2. Ibid., p 189.
3. I. V. Kovalev, "Transport v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne (1941-1945)" [Transport in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)], Moscow, Nauka, 1981, p 388.
4. "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol IV, 1959, pp 691-693.
5. Ibid., p 684.
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7. S. S. Kosovich, A. M. Filimonov, "Sovetskiye zheleznodorozhnyye" [Soviet Railroad Troops], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, p 203.
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9. M. I. Grishin, "Voyennyye soobshcheniya v kampanii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil na Dalnem Vostoke" [Military Railroads in the Campaign

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CSO: 1801/33

## BOURGEOIS FALSIFICATION OF WAR WITH JAPAN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 85 (signed to press 23 Jul 85) pp 67-69

[Article by Candidate of Philological Sciences, Lt Col V. I. Pogrebenkov: "Washington's Atomic Blackmail (On the 40th Anniversary of the Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki)"]

[Text] Over the last 40 years in the calendar of history there probably are no more tragic dates for the fate of mankind than 6 and 9 August 1945. On these days, as is known, atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The U.S. military-political leadership in using various propaganda tricks, has offered this barbarous act as the employment of atomic weapons to accelerate the defeat of Japan and end World War II.

However, the facts of history and postwar U.S. policy show something else. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the military viewpoint was a senseless and cruel act and pursued primarily the political goals of intimidating the Soviet Union and establishing conditions for carrying out a policy aimed at establishing world domination for American imperialism. The American scholar G. Alperowitz later called this "atomic diplomacy" while the U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Stimson termed it the "trump card" in the diplomatic arsenal of the United States.(1)

The monopoly possession of atomic weapons had a dizzying effect on the political thinking of American statesmen. H. Truman who became the American president on the eve of the end of the war viewed the atomic bomb in the hands of Washington as a means which would allow the United States at its discretion to change the entire subsequent course of "history and civilization." A majority of the leaders in the administration and Congress felt that "the presence of the bomb in the American arsenals would give them in the future constant predominance over other peoples."(2) By massive and total propagandizing of the public, the White House succeeded in bending American public opinion toward support of the adventurist policy of the ruling circles. As Gen Maxwell Taylor who held high military posts in the United States pointed out, "the American people easily believed that the atomic bomb was an absolute weapon which would make it possible for the United States, its sole possessor, to maintain order throughout the world by threatening its use."(3)

In impatiently waiting for the end of work on developing the atomic bomb, President Truman felt that, by relying on the new weapon, the United States in the course of the forthcoming Potsdam talks, could easily put the Russians "in their place." Analogous ideas were also voiced by the American Secretary of State Burns. As was pointed out by one of the participants in the development of the atomic weapon R. Oppenheimer, "inconceivable pressure was put on us to test the nuclear device before the leaders of the three countries assembled in Potsdam...." Truman could go to the talks on the postwar settlement of the world with the "atomic bomb behind his back" and for precisely this reason twice insisted on shifting the dates for the opening of the Berlin Conference.(4) He arrived there only on the eve of the atomic bomb testing which was set for the following day. "When I was forced to leave for Potsdam," wrote Truman in his memoirs, "preparations for testing the atomic bomb at Alamo Gordo, New Mexico, were carried out with maximum speed. During my trip to Europe, I impatiently awaited information on the results." Information on the successful conclusion of the testing for the atomic bomb, in the words of H. Stimson, gave Truman "a completely new sense of confidence." (5) This "confidence" was immediately felt at the next session of the Potsdam Conference. Truman's manner of refuting the proposals made by the Soviet side became provocative and uncontestable.

The dates for the atomic bombing of the Japanese cities of 6 and 9 August were chosen far from accidentally. In the aim of intimidation and blackmail, the United States decided to take the date of the Soviet entry into the war against Japan as an "atomic bracket" and drop one bomb on the eve and the other immediately after the entry of the Soviet Union into the war. The English professor P. Blackett in his book "Fear, War and the Bomb" has taken up this coincidence in time in detail and has concluded that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima marked the first volley in the "cold war." (6)

The Washington falsifiers of history have asserted that atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki only after Japan refused to surrender under the conditions of the Potsdam Declaration. Such an assertion, however, contradicts the facts. Even on 23 July, that is, 4 days prior to the publishing of the Potsdam Declaration the draft of an order drawn up by Groves to the Commander of the Strategic Aviation, Gen C. Spaatz, was sent from Washington to Potsdam for approval by the American president: "After 3 August, as soon as the weather conditions permit visual bombing to be carried out, the 509th Mixed Air Regiment of the 20th Air Army is to drop the first special bomb on one of the following targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, Nagasaki." On 24 July, a coded radio message was sent from Potsdam to the Pentagon: "The Groves directive is approved by the president." (7) This meant that the order for the atomic bombing of Japan was in effect.

The bombs dropped on the two Japanese cities were the means of achieving not military but primarily the political aims of the ruling U.S. circles. Such a conclusion was also drawn by a commission of American experts: "The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not bring about the defeat of Japan and in addition they, according to the evidence of the hostile leaders who ended the war, did not cause Japan to accept unconditional surrender." (8) Only after the defeat of the million-strong Kwantung Army by the Soviet Armed Forces was Japan forced to surrender.



Let us point out a very symptomatic fact for U.S. nuclear policy. While the bombing of Hiroshima was carried out under a presidential decision, the dropping of the bomb on Nagasaki, as Michael Emrin has written in his book "The Great Decision," was carried out by the initiative of the commanders in the Japanese theater of operations. President Eisenhower who replaced Truman hinted that he had warned "the commanders on the spot to decide whether it was necessary to use nuclear weapons and if so, at what time." The former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Air Force, Gen Earl Patridge, directly stated that "the Air Force Command was empowered to employ nuclear weapons in combat without special presidential approval."

The documentary evidence published in recent years in the United States is persuasive that such "intimidation" was viewed merely as a short-term task and all the forces and means were secretly being directed at preparing a nuclear war against the USSR and eliminating it not only as a socialist state but also simply as a sovereign state. On 3 November 1945, the Joint Intelligence Committee in Document No. 329 demanded the selecting of 20 major targets for atomic strikes on Soviet territory, including Moscow, Leningrad, Gorkiy, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Tashkent and others. According to the Charioteer Plan worked out in mid-1948, some 133 atomic bombs were to be dropped on 70 Soviet cities.(10) The new American joint integrated strategic plan for target allocation (S10P-5P) set some 40,000 potential strike objectives on Soviet territory.(11)

To place hopes on the atomic bomb as the "trump card" in the political game with the USSR -- this hope from the very outset was an adventure fraught with danger for the cause of peace. However, like reckless gamblers, the Washington strategists again and again increased the stakes in the game, grasping for one and then another technical innovation in the hope of using it as a means of political blackmail and achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union. Having lost the monopoly on the atomic bomb, they grasped the hydrogen bomb and then wagered on missile-carrying submarines, in the 1970's on missiles with independently targetable warheads and neutron weapons. Now they are endeavoring to militarize space.

The wise and balanced policy of our party in the area of strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet state and raising the might of its Armed Forces has acted in a sobering manner on the hotheads in favor of military adventures. As was pointed out at the March (1985) Extraordinary Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee by the General Secretary of the Central Committee, M. S. Gorbachev, "in the complicated international situation, as never before, it is important to maintain the defense capability of our motherland on such a level that the potential aggressors are well aware that encroaching on the security of the Soviet nation and its allies and on the peaceful life of Soviet people will be met by a crushing retaliatory strike."(12)

#### FOOTNOTES

1. See: B. Grayner, K. Stayngaus, "Na puti k 3-y mirovoy voyne? Voyennyye plany SSHA protiv SSSR. Dokumenty" [On the Way to a Third World War? Military Plans of the United States Against the USSR. Documents],

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2. See: Yu. Listvinov, "Apokalipsis iz Vashingtona (SShA: oruzhiye i politika)" [Apocalypse from Washington (the United States: Weapons and Policy)], Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1984, p 19; J. Gaddis, "The U.S. and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947," No. 4, 1972, pp 255-256.
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12. "Materialy vneocherednogo Plenuma Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS 11 marta 1985 goda" [Materials of the Extraordinary Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of 11 march 1985], Moscow, Politizdat, 1985, p 13.

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## RESULTS, IMPORTANCE OF IASI-KISHINEV OPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 85 (signed to press 23 Jul 85) pp 70-79

[Unattributed article under the rubric: "Operations of the Great Patriotic War"; the questions relating to the development of military art in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation were taken up in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1984.]

[Text] The Soviet people and all progressive humanity have celebrated the 40th anniversary of the day of the victorious conclusion of the unprecedented battle against the most reactionary shock force of imperialism, Nazism. One of the most important places in this battle is held by the Iasi-Kishinev Operation which has gone down in the history of wars as the Iasi-Kishinev Cannae.

The enormous successes of the Soviet Army in the south of the Ukraine and its entry of Romanian territory in the spring of 1944 led to an abrupt change in the military-political situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German Front. In the course of the retreat, the enemy suffered great losses in personnel and equipment. The Soviet troops held an advantageous position for initiating new offensive operations.

Nazi Germany, having occupied the Balkan countries and having established a regime of terror and violence in them, used the most important sources of raw products and materials in the interests of conducting a predatory war. Moreover, Romania and other Balkan countries in terms of their natural conditions represented an important strategic staging area convenient for organizing the defensive. For this reason Germany endeavored to hold this area at any price.

The English and American imperialists were also hatching perfidious plans against the Balkan countries. They were planning to use these countries as a "cordon sanitaire" against the Soviet Union. As documents show, the American representative Allen Dulles during secret separate talks at the end of 1943 in Switzerland with the German representative, Prince M. Hohenlohe, stated that "by enlarging Poland to the east and maintaining Romania and a strong Hungary it is essential to support the creation of a cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism and Pan-Slavism."(1)

The U.S. and English ruling circles gave particular importance to capturing the Balkans before the Soviet Army reached this area in order to prevent the victories of people's democratic revolutions, to maintain a bourgeois regime in these countries and seize advantageous positions for their future adventures.

The plans of the American and English imperialists vis-a-vis the Balkans impressed the reactionary forces of Romania and certain other Balkan countries. As pointed out by the Romanian historian M. Fetu, the government of I. Antonescu as well as the leaders of the bourgeois parties J. Maniu and I. Bratianu proposed going over to the side of the anti-Hitler coalition at the moment that the Anglo-American troops would reach the Danube. But these plans involved a great danger for the peoples of the Balkan countries as they were aimed at maintaining reactionary, antipopular regimes in them and replacing German occupation by Anglo-American rule.

However, the realization of the imperialist plans was being blocked by the growing might of the USSR, by the major successes of the Soviet Army, by the growth of the national-liberation movement of the Balkan peoples and by the flexible foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The decisive actions by the Soviet troops in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation played a definite role in thwarting these plans.

The Iasi-Kishinev Operation commenced in a situation of decisive victories for the Soviet Army along the entire Soviet-German Front as well as under the conditions of an intensified liberation struggle by the peoples of the Balkan countries.

By the start of the operation, on a line 580 km long running through Krasnoilsk, Pascani, to the north of Iasi, Kishinev and further along the Dniester, the defensive was occupied by the Army Group Southern Ukraine. This included the 6th and 8th German Armies, the 3d and 4th Romanian Armies as well as the XVII Separate German Corps. The Nazi and Romanian troops had 900,000 men, 7,600 guns and mortars, 404 tanks and assault guns. Their actions were supported by a portion of the 4th Air Fleet and a Romanian air corps numbering 810 combat aircraft altogether.(3) In addition, around 60,000 Nazi soldiers and officers were part of garrisons in the rear areas of Romania. In using the numerous water obstacles and hilly terrain, the Nazi Command had established a strong, deeply echeloned defense with a developed system of engineer obstacles.

Considering the existing situation, Hq SHC, in the directive of 2 August 1944, set the following mission for the troops of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts: to break through the enemy defenses on two separate areas (to the northwest of Iasi and to the south of Bendery) and, in developing the offensive along convergent axes, to surround and destroy the basic forces of the Army Group Southern Ukraine and then develop a rapid offensive deep into Romania.(4)

In accord with the overall plan of the operation, the fronts were to launch deep attacks against the most vulnerable places in the enemy defenses. The main assault grouping of the Second Ukrainian Front (commander, Army Gen



R. Ya. Malinovskiy) was to advance around the Iasi and Tirgu Frumos fortified areas and this would make it possible to seal off the 6th German Army from the 8th Army and skirt the impassable ranges of the Eastern Carpathians to the south. The Third Ukrainian Front (commander, Army Gen F. I. Tolbukhin) by attacking from the Kitskan bridgehead on the boundary of the German and Romanian troops on the Husi axis was to split the forces of the 6th German Army and the 3d Romanian Army and together with troops from the Second Ukrainian Front to destroy the 6th German Army. The left wing of the Third Ukrainian Front with the support of the Black Sea Fleet, was to encircle and defeat the 3d Romanian Army.

Headquarters demanded that the main forces of both fronts be concentrated on defeating the Kishinev enemy grouping, rightly assuming that the successful carrying out of this main task would create favorable conditions for the rapid advance of the Soviet Army deep into Romania and for capturing its basic economic and political centers. "Powerful attacks against the defenses of the Nazi ally should have, as I. V. Stalin assumed, an influence on the policy of the Royal Romanian government and help take it out of the war."(5)

In certain works, foreign authors in referring to the Headquarters directive of 2 August, reduce the aim of the operation to defeating the enemy grouping in the area of Iasi, Kishinev and reaching Focsani. These authors do not consider that this directive set the goals of the operation for its first stage. The subsequent tasks of the operation were set out by the Headquarters directives of 21 and 29 August as well as by instructions of the front commanders. Army Gen S. M. Shtemenko who was the chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff and took part in working out the plan of the operation, has written that after the Headquarters session certain adjustments were made in the plans of the fronts. For the Second Ukrainian Front, the mission was formulated in the following manner: "The aim of the planned operation is to defeat the enemy on the Iasi sector and together with the Third Ukrainian Front to surround and destroy the German divisions of the enemy Kishinev grouping. On the fifth day of the offensive they were to reach a line of Bacau, Deleni, Husi. Subsequently, the thrust against Focsani was to be developed in the aim of capturing the Romanian oil fields."(6)

The Iasi-Kishinev Operation commenced on 20 August 1944. The troop offensive was preceded by a powerful artillery softening up and on the Third Ukrainian Front also air softening up in the course of which the enemy defensive system was disorganized, the trenches and communications trenches were destroyed, troop command on the company-regiment level was lost and the personnel shaken by the great losses of personnel and equipment. Thus, a prisoner from the 76th German Infantry Division stated that "the division lost up to 80 percent of the personnel, the 187th Infantry Regiment lost all the battalion commanders, command in the regiment was disrupted and soldiers and officers are retreating in disorder."(7) In order to halt the further advance of the Soviet troops, the Nazi Command quickly shifted three infantry divisions and one tank division from its reserve to the Iasi area. However, the enemy counterattacks were unable to check the Soviet advance. Troops from the 6th Tank Army were committed to the breakthrough and these, having overcome stubborn enemy resistance, exploited the success and began to pursue the retreating enemy units and formations.



[Key for map on preceding page]

- Key: 1--The front line by the end of 19 August  
2--Defensive lines of Nazi troops  
3--Axes of Soviet troop attacks 20-24 August  
4--Crossing of Dniester Estuary on 22 August  
5--Crossing routes of ships and landing of amphibious troops  
6--Breakthrough of ships from the Danube Naval Flotilla into the Dniester Estuary and the Danube delta  
7--Front line by the end of 24 August  
8--Axes of Soviet troop attacks 25-29 August  
9--Front line and position of Soviet troops by end of 29 August  
10--Actions of Danube Naval Flotilla

The former commander of the Army Group Southern Ukraine, Gen H. Friesner, in his memoirs pointed out that the result of the battles on 20 August was catastrophic. On the first day of the offensive by the Soviet troops, the enemy lost nine divisions. The Romanian troops suffered particularly high losses. "In the Dumitrescu Army Group," writes Friesner, "both Romanian divisions of the XXIX Army Corps (the 4th Mountain-Infantry and 21st Infantry) were completely shattered. In the Veler Army Group up to five Romanian divisions were completely routed." (8) The high losses suffered by the Romanian troops told on their morale. Entire units began to surrender. Antonescu ordered that "everyone fleeing from the enemy" be shot and created officer punitive detachments to combat them. On 21 August, the German Command issued orders to Gen Kirchner to prohibit the Romanian units making up his group from carrying out the orders of the 4th Romanian Army to retreat to new lines.

In the morning of 22 August, the German Command of the Army Group Southern Ukraine received Hitler's approval to pull the troops back from the Kishinev Salient to the line of the Mare Range, the Prut River. "But," as Friesner pointed out, "it was already too late!" (9) With the arrival on 23 August of the XVIII Tank Corps in the Husi area, the VII Mechanized Corps at the crossings of the Prut River in the Leuseni area and the IV Guards Mechanized Corps in the Leovo area, the operational encirclement of the Kishinev grouping was completed as all escape routes beyond the Prut were cut. The Headquarters representative MSU S. K. Timoshenko reported at 2300 hours on 23 August to Headquarters: "As a result of the 4 days of the operation, the troops of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts today, on 23 August, have completed the operational encirclement of the Kishinev grouping...." (10) The attempts of the German troops encircled in the Kishinev Salient to break out of the trap came to nothing. The Soviet troops fighting on the external perimeter liberated the important strongpoint of the town of Roman and during the night of 24 August, the town of Birlad and were approaching the town of Bacau.

The Nazi Gen K. Tippleskirch, in commenting on the rapidity of the Soviet offensive in the operation, has written: "The enemy troops crashed upon us like enormous sea waves and inundated the German forces from all sides. Any centralized leadership over combat was halted and the rear areas were cut off.... The German troops split up into individual combat groups were forced



to make their way to the west.... The ring of Russian troops around several German divisions was pulled so tight that they had to surrender."(11)

Under the existing situation, Gen Friesner issued orders to his troops to retreat to the Carpathian positions. But the main forces of the German Army were no longer able to do this. On 24 August, the formations of the Second Ukrainian Front eliminated the narrow corridor which had formed the day before and tightly closed the ring of encirclement around the enemy grouping. On the same day, Soviet troops liberated the towns of Bacau, Tirgu Neamt, Husi and Tecuc, they cut the road to Focsani and developed a rapid offensive deep into Romania. As was pointed out in the combat journal of the Second Ukrainian Front for August 1944, "by the end of 23 August, our troops had broadened the breakthrough to 240 km along the front and 80 km in depth, they had defeated all the enemy operational reserves which tried to halt our advance and had come out into the operational expanse, having thus cut off the escape routes for the Kishinev grouping to the south and southwest. By the end of 23 August, the defeat of the Romanian troops opposing the Second Ukrainian Front was complete."(12) The troops of the Third Ukrainian Front together with the Black Sea Fleet surrounded the 3d Romanian Army and forced it to surrender.

As a result, conditions were created for the Soviet troops to break through into the central regions of Romania and force the country out of the war on the side of Nazi Germany. Prospects were also opened for the Soviet troops to rapidly reach the frontiers of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the Hungarian Plain, in the rear of the enemy grouping fighting in the Carpathians.

The crushing defeat of the major German-Romanian grouping by the Soviet troops deprived the Antonescu government of its main support, the army, and led to the collapse of German defenses on the southern wing of the Soviet-German Front. It altered the military-political situation in the Balkans and thereby established decisive conditions for a victory of the armed revolt of 23 August 1944 carried out by the patriotic forces headed by the communists, for the overthrow of the fascist regime in Romania, for taking it out of the war and expelling the Nazis from Romanian territory. At this crucial historical moment for the Romanian people, the determining role in the success of the antifascist revolt was played by the military and political might of the Soviet Union and by the decisive actions of the Soviet Army. "The moment of the overthrow of the Antonescu fascist dictatorship and the entry of Romania into the just war against Nazi Germany," said G. Gheorghiu-Dej, "was chosen by the Central Committee of our party considering the favorable conditions created by the rapid Soviet advance on the Iasi-Kishinev Front."(13)

Contrary to irrefutable historical facts, certain foreign historians have endeavored to play down the role of the Soviet Army in defeating the basic forces of the Army Group Southern Ukraine and explain the defeat of the Nazi troops by political factors. In a number of works published outside our nation, the antifascist revolt in Romania is depicted outside the context of events on the Soviet-German Front and not considering the successful development of the Iasi-Kishinev Operation as well as the conditions of the Truce Agreement which were imposed by the Soviet Union on behalf of the three Great Powers (USSR, United States and England). There is a serious shift of



emphasis toward exaggerating the role of the revolt and playing down the role of the Soviet Army in establishing favorable external conditions for the victory of the rebels. Thus, the West German historian W. Wagner in the book "The Dividing of Europe" has asserted that supposedly "by a single blow he (King Michael.--Editors) opened the gates to the Balkans for the Soviet troops."(14)

Undoubtedly, the antifascist armed insurrection of the Romanian people played an essential role in overthrowing the fascist Antonescu dictatorship. But historical truth is that its success was predetermined by the brilliant victory of the Soviet Army in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation. Incidentally, this is also recognized by certain historians in the West. The West German historian L. Gruchman, for example, in turning to the subject of the Iasi-Kishinev Operation, has written: "The Soviet troops, as a result of the rapid advance by the two Ukrainian fronts, carried out a deep breakthrough in the German defenses and captured the undestroyed bridges across the Prut and Danube Rivers, thereby opening the way to Cucharest and Dobrudja.... In the developing situation -- hopeless in military terms -- the Antonescu government was overthrown on 23 August."(15)

At the same time, the path of further social development in Romania was determined by the Romanian people themselves without any outside interference. Of important significance in this regard was the Declaration of the Soviet Government on Events in Romania of 23 August 1944. It stated "that the Soviet Union does not intend to acquire any portion of Romanian territory or change the existing social system in Romania, or in any manner encroach on Romanian independence. On the contrary, the Soviet government feels it necessary along with the Romanians to restore Romanian independence by liberating Romania from the Nazi yoke."(16)

**The decisive influence of the victory of the Soviet troops in this operation on the overthrow of the fascist regime** was stated in the party documents of the RCP [Romanian Communist Party]: "The decisive factor which brought about the overthrow of the Antonescu regime was the breakthrough of the German Front in Moldov and the rapid advance of the Red Army toward Bucharest."(17)

having received news of the events in Bucharest, Hitler ordered the revolt be suppressed, the king to be arrested and a government to be established headed by "a general who favored friendship with Germany."(18) At the same time, the reactionary majority of the Santescu government and the king urgently asked the Anglo-American Command to quickly send in three airborne brigades to the Bucharest area, hoping with their aid to halt the development of the revolt and maintain the reactionary regime in the country.

During the morning of 24 August, Nazi aviation barbarously bombed the Romanian capital. The new Romanian government of Gen Santescu declared war on Germany and ordered the army to disarm the Germans. The rebels in Bucharest, Ploesti and other places under the leadership of the RCP conducted a courageous struggle against the Nazis.

Under the developing situation, the strengthening of the revolt's success depended not only upon the heroic struggle of the rebels but chiefly upon the

speed and decisiveness of Soviet Army operations. A lessening of the pressure of the Soviet troops or a reduction in their rate of advance could be used by the German Command for shifting forces into Romania and suppressing the revolt. Considering this, the Soviet Command made every effort to provide quick and effective aid to the rebels. Having assigned a portion of the forces to eliminate the surrounded grouping (34 divisions), it aimed the main forces of the fronts (over 50 divisions) at an offensive deep into Romania.

The troops on the left wing of the Second Ukrainian Front, with active air support, in destroying individual centers of enemy defenses, moved quickly to the south. The 6th Tank Army crossed the Nazi fortified line and on 26 August liberated Focsani. On the following day it approached the town of Buzau, the capture of which would permit the development of a further offensive against Ploesti and Bucharest. The rapid actions of the Soviet troops to eliminate the surrounded enemy grouping and their rapid advance deep into Romanian territory deprived the Nazi Command of the opportunity to remove any units from the front for fighting against the rebels and thereby created good conditions for the victory of the armed insurrection.

This was no "march with weapons on shoulders," as certain foreign historians have written about this. Such a treatment of the course of military operations is a flagrant distortion of historical truth. A large grouping of Soviet troops numbering more than 1.25 million men participated in the liberation of Romania from fascism. By the start of the operation the grouping had 16,000 guns and mortars, around 1,900 tanks and 2,200 combat aircraft.(19) In the course of the offensive, the troops of the fronts had to break through numerous deliberate defensive lines to a depth of over 80 km, to surmount stubborn enemy resistance and fight under bad terrain conditions. The intensity of combat can be seen from the fact that in the struggle to liberate the Romanian people from fascism, the Soviet Army lost 286,000 men, including 69,000 killed and buried on Romanian territory.(20) "We express," said Nikolae Ceausescu, "our gratitude to the glorious army of the Soviet Union which at a price of enormous sacrifice destroyed the Nazi military machine and made a decisive contribution to liberating Romania and other countries from the Nazi yoke, as well as to the defeat of Nazi Germany."(21)

Nor does the assertion that the Focsani Gates were intentionally left "free" by the Romanian Army for the "unobstructed" advance of the Soviet troops conform to historical truth. The OKW Directive of 26 August set the task for the commander of the Army Group Southern Ukraine of establishing and holding the defenses along the line of the Eastern Carpathians, Focsani, Galati. On this line the remnants of German divisions continued to put up stubborn resistance. The troops of the 27th, 53d and 6th Tank Armies, with active air support, had to crush the enemy defensive centers by decisive actions and after neutralizing them develop the offensive into the interior of Romania.(22) Stubborn combat was also carried out by formations of the 40th and 7th Armies and the cavalry-mechanized group on the Carpathian sector, where remnants of the 8th German Army and units of the Hungarian Horthy troops were concentrated.

The enemy put up strong resistance in the Buzau area. In the battles for this town, 1,500 enemy soldiers and officers were killed and 1,200 taken prisoner.

In the area of Calarasi, units of the 46th Soviet Army in cooperation with Romanian troops, captured several thousand German soldiers and officers assigned to advance against Bucharest from the southeast. In the Urziceni area, a column of Nazis numbering around 2,000 men was disarmed. The rapid advance of the Soviet troops and air supremacy of Soviet aviation forced the Nazis to move the 4th Air Fleet into Hungary and halt the bombing of Bucharest.

On 29 August, Soviet troops were approaching Ploesti and Bucharest. By this time, units of the Third Ukrainian Front had entered the cities of Tulcea, Galati, Braila, Sulina and Constanta. Fighting to liberate Ploesti were Romanian rebels as well as subunits from the 18th Romanian Infantry Division which had deserted the front along with the Soviet V Guards Tank Corps of the 6th Tank Army and the 3d Guards Airborne Division.

With the capture of Ploesti, the Nazi Army was deprived of Romanian oil, the threat to Bucharest from the north was eliminated and the Soviet and Romanian troops were able to enter Transylvania.

On 31 August, Soviet troops entered Bucharest which had been liberated by Romanian rebels. Entering with them were units of the 1st Romanian Tudor Vladimirescu Volunteer Division which had been organized on Soviet territory. The capital's population arranged a joyous greeting for the Soviet troops and Romanian volunteers.

The Iasi-Kishinev Operation ended with a brilliant victory for the Soviet troops. In the course of, in just 10 days, the almost million-strong enemy grouping, the Army Group Southern Ukraine, was routed. As was pointed out in the combat journal of the group, this represented "the greatest catastrophe which the army group has ever experienced."<sup>(23)</sup> The Soviet troops destroyed 22 German divisions and also routed virtually all the Romanian divisions on the front. Some 208,600 soldiers and officers were captured, 490 tanks and assault guns, 1,500 guns, 298 aircraft and 15,000 motor vehicles were destroyed; the Soviet troops captured more than 2,000 guns, 340 tanks and assault guns, around 18,000 motor vehicles, 40 aircraft and much other combat equipment and weapons.<sup>(24)</sup>

Subsequently, the troops of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts, in accord with the Headquarters Directive of 29 August 1944, initiated an energetic offensive in the central part of Romania and on the approaches to Bulgaria. As a result of this, Soviet troops broke through the enemy strategic front on an enormous sector of 500 km and advanced up to 750 km in depth. The Nazi grouping in Northern Transylvania and the Carpathian Ukraine was outflanked from the southwest, a threat was created to enemy lines of communications in Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania, and the strategic situation of Nazi Germany in the Balkans deteriorated sharply. The successes of the Soviet Army were an enormous military and moral support for the Balkan peoples in their struggle against the Nazi invaders.

The Nazi Command, having lost the main forces of the army group, was able to restore the strategic front only in mid-September, when Hungarian Horthy



troops were used for this purpose along with German formations removed from the Balkan Front and which, in essence, merged with the Eastern Front.

In withdrawing from the war on the side of Nazi Germany, Romania joined the anti-Hitler coalition. Its armed forces, in fighting together with the Soviet troops, participated in the liberation of a number of Southeastern European countries. The joint struggle against Naziism in the final stage of World War II marked the beginning to the relations of friendship and cooperation between our peoples and armies.

The victory of the Soviet troops in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation also had enormous significance for the liberation of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and other Balkan countries. "For us, Bulgarians, for the fate of Bulgaria," said Todor Zhivkov, "a particularly important role was played by the Iasi-Kishinev Operation as a result of which the southern Nazi Front was completely routed...."(25)

Direct aid to allied Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia became possible. The threat hanging over the lines of communications of the Balkan German grouping subsequently forced the Nazis to begin to pull their troops out of Greece and Albania. An important step was taken toward the final defeat of Nazi Germany.

The expulsion of the Nazi occupiers from Romania and Bulgaria by the Soviet Army together with the patriotic forces of these countries established favorable conditions for the victory of people's-democratic revolutions.

"The decisive aid of the Soviet Union," commented Todor Zhivkov, "is a distinguishing feature of not only our September Socialist Revolution but all the people's democratic revolutions in the European countries. None of these countries would have been able to liberate itself without the victories of the Red Army and without its direct aid. This objective historical fact in no way plays down the importance of their antifascist struggle and does not lead to its underestimation. Also contrary to historical truth are certain tendencies to depict the people's democratic revolutions as a whole and each of them individually either as not caused by objective internal processes (here we again encounter the reactionary theory of 'exporting revolution') or as a result of the actions of just internal forces."(26)

The defeat of the main forces of the Army Group Southern Ukraine in the course of the Iasi-Kishinev Operation sharply altered the military-political situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German Front and had a great impact upon the further course of the armed struggle. Prospects opened up for the Soviet troops to rapidly advance deep into the Balkan Peninsula and launch the last powerful blows against the enemy.

The Iasi-Kishinev Operation was a brilliant example of Soviet military art and an indicator of the high skill of the Soviet Army. Along with the other operations of the Great Patriotic War, it contributed to the victory of the Soviet people over Naziism. "In defending the liberty and independence of the motherland," said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M. S. Gorbachev, "the Soviet people also carried out a great international mission of saving world civilization from Naziism. As a result of its defeat the



positions of progressive, democratic forces were strengthened and this led to the victory of a new social order in a number of European and Asian countries."(27)

The complexity and intensity of the present situation in the world necessitates the greatest possible improvement and enrichment of collaboration between the fraternal states and a deepening of their cooperation in all areas, in organically reconciling national and international interests. As was emphasized at the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "an insurmountable force in the struggle for the peaceful future of mankind is the strong commonwealth of socialist states, its economic and defense might and unity of actions on the international scene."(28)

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21. Nicolae Ceausescu, "Rumyniya na puti postroyeniya vsestoronne razvitogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva" [Romania on the Path of Building a Fully Developed Socialist Society], Bucharest, Meridiane, Vol 5, 1971, p 866.
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25. Todor Zhivkov, "Izbrannyye stati i rechi, 1965-1975" [Selected Articles and Speeches, 1965-1975], Moscow, Politizdat, 1975, p 569.
26. Todor Zhivkov, "A Historic Victory of Lasting Importance," KOMMUNIST, No 7, 1985, p 102.
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VOLKOGONOV BOOK; MARXISM-LENINISM ON WAR AND ARMY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 85 (signed to press 23 Jul 85) pp 85-87

[Review by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Col V. T. Login of the book "Marksistsko-leninskoye ucheniye o voyne i armii [Biblioteka ofitsera]" (Marxist-Leninist Teachings About War and the Army (The Officer's Library)), edited by D. A. Volkogonov, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, 335 pages]

[Text] Under present-day conditions, when due to the fault of the aggressive imperialist forces headed by the United States, the international situation has become sharply more complex, the theoretical problems of war, the army and peace have assumed particular pertinence. This is why with each passing year the military personnel shows greater interest in studying Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army. Here one will be greatly aided by the recently published work by a collective of authors under the editorship of Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Prof, Lt Gen D. A. Volkogonov. "The study of war and the army, being an organic part of Marxist-Leninist teachings about society," the book emphasizes, "analyze and theoretically generalize military-political practice of the masses of people, classes, political parties, states, as well as their specific organizations and institutions" (p 10).

The monograph contains three parts: war and its historical fate, the army and society, and the factors of war and military organizational development. It consists of an introduction, 18 chapters and a conclusion. It would seem that such a structure for the work distinguishes it from previous editions on this subject, since it, in the first place, views war more starkly in the context of the struggle for peace and the prevention of war and, secondly, provides a thorough analysis not only of the factors of war itself but also military organizational development. Here the accent has been put on the factors which increase the combat readiness of the USSR Armed Forces and the armies of the socialist commonwealth. Such a shift in structural emphasis is no accident as it conforms to the ideas advanced at the 26th CPSU Congress and the subsequent Central Committee plenums.

The book reflects the new achievements of Marxist-Leninist theory in elaborating the questions of war and the army. In this context, of interest is Chapter VI of the first part "Historical Fates of War. The Ways of Strengthening Peace" as well as the chapters in the third part "The Combat

Readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces and the Defense Might of the Nation" and "The Communist Party -- The Organizer of the Socialist Fatherland's Defense." The material in other chapters of all three parts has been substantially reworked.

The book provides a profound and thorough analysis of the origin, causes and essence of wars. The authors have persuasively established the conclusion that precisely "with the appearance of an antagonistic class society, its permanent accomplice, war, arose...the source of war, its genesis resides in the very exploiting system based upon private ownership of the means of production and the suppression of the workers" (p 19).

We find very rational the establishing in the book of a series of levels for the historical causality of the rise of wars. The level of the fundamental causes reflects the profound links of the exploiting system which give rise to class antagonistic contradictions and for this reason are a constant source of conflicts, including such a form of them as wars. The authors have convincingly shown that not the main contradiction between the two opposing social systems, as bourgeois sociologists have endeavored to "prove," but rather the presence of imperialism with its grasping adventuristic policy which is the general, fundamental cause of all wars of the 20th Century, including World Wars I and II, the numerous local wars and military conflicts of recent years. Under present-day conditions, a persuasive example of this is the hegemonistic policy of the American imperialists who for the sake of their own selfish interests have repeatedly initiated numerous local wars.

The authors also examine the other levels of the causality of wars, in particular the specific, particular causes and the single, partial causes. It is pointed out that "a consideration of the different levels of causality makes it more possible to more profoundly understand the causes of wars in the modern era as well as the ways and methods for blocking the appearance of these causes..." (p 22).

In a study of wars of the past and contemporary wars, the most important place is held by the defining of their social essence. In relying on the thesis of Marxism-Leninism about the link between war and politics, the authors of the reviewed work soundly show that in structural terms the essence of war is comprised of two main components: a definite policy and its continuation in a specific form, in the form of armed violence (p 24). Policy is a class phenomenon. For this reason wars also always have a class nature.

The authors quite rightly emphasize that "a nuclear missile war fully maintains the general social essence of a war at its genetic basis, that is, the continuation of policy by other, violent means. On the one hand, the policy of the aggressive aspirations of imperialism and on the other, the policy of defending the victories of socialism" (p 28).

Along with a profound analysis of the thesis of the Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war, the book also provides a thorough critique of the anti-Marxist concepts of the causes and essence of modern wars.



A special chapter is devoted to the historical types of wars. Their classification is based upon two Leninist principles: in the first place, consideration of the direct link of a war with a certain era and, secondly, the main historical significance of a war. The chapter provides an analysis of the basic types of wars in the modern age in accord with their significance.

It must be pointed out that, in examining a war between capitalist nations as one of the types of modern wars, the authors have missed an opportunity to show that instance when such a war can have a directly opposite nature for the belligerents. On this level, they should have more fully shown the essence of the example given of the Anglo-Argentine conflict (1982) and shown the aggressive role of U.S. imperialism in it.

Of great interest is the chapter devoted to an analysis of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland, as a particular type of just wars. The theses and conclusions of this chapter are of great importance for profoundly understanding the measures being taken by the CPSU, the Soviet government and the fraternal socialist nations to defend the victories of socialism under conditions where the imperialists have proclaimed a "crusade" against the USSR and the other socialist countries.

In the chapter dedicated to an analysis of the general laws of war, the essence and system of laws of wars have been thoroughly examined using historical examples. In particular, the mechanism for the natural outbreak of World War II has been shown. The correct solution to the problem of the general laws of war in the given chapter is of important methodological significance. In the first place, a knowledge of these wars makes it possible to predict the development of military events, to correctly assess the nature of the wars being prepared by the imperialists, the methods of their initiation and conduct and, consequently, to correctly organize the training of the troops and naval forces to repel possible aggression. Secondly, these laws provide a methodological key to a truly scientific analysis and assessment of the causes of the outbreak, course and results of each specific war and on this basis make it possible to draw sound conclusions.

The second part of the monograph is devoted to an analysis of the army as an instrument of the state. In the reviewed work, a number of new aspects of this special social institution is brought out. Thus, in emphasizing that the army is primarily a state body created "in its image and likeness," the authors point out that "in certain instances the concept of an 'army' is also applied to armed formations organized not by the state, not by the ruling classes, but rather by the suppressed classes (by their parties) for fighting against the existing state power for their own liberation" (p 127).

Undoubtedly a merit of this portion of the work is that a class approach lies at the basis of the analysis of the army's nature, its purpose and functions performed. History shows that exploiting classes and their ideologists have always endeavored and presently are endeavoring to conceal the class nature of the army, and to represent it as a "supraclass" or "politically neutral" force which supposedly defends the interests of all classes in the given society or

state. The book soundly unmask such views of modern bourgeois ideologists concerning the army.

On the basis of the Marxist-Leninist methodology of military history, the authors provide a scientific description of the main historical types of armies. Here it is emphasized that within the same class-historical type (one class essence), in the political content of the army's activities there can be profound changes brought about by shifts in the economic base of society, its political system and so forth.

Relying on rich factual material in special chapters, the social essence and functions of armies and military alliances in the capitalist (primarily imperialist) states, on the one hand, and the armies of the socialist states, on the other, are brought out. The fundamental opposition of these basic types of armies in the modern age is shown both for their class nature and social purpose as well as for the internal and external functions performed by them. The work shows in detail the aggressive nature of the military blocs of imperialism and the defensive focus and purpose of the Warsaw Pact.

The second part ends with a chapter which examines various aspects of military collaboration among the socialist commonwealth countries aimed at strengthening their defense might for the purpose of collective defense of the victories of socialism in the event of imperialist aggression.

The third part of the book provides an analysis of the factors of war and military organizational development. In particular, of great interest is the chapter "The Military Might of a State." It defines this concept precisely: "Marxist-Leninist science defines and views military might as the aggregate of material and spiritual capabilities of a society which are used by the ruling class or by the state for waging a war or for carrying out other international as well as domestic tasks with the use of armed force. Military might is directly embodied in the state's army and in its ability to be an implement of politics" (p 210).

In the third part of the work significant space has been given to an analysis of the factors which ensure victory in just wars and which cause defeat in unjust, predatory wars. The authors examine the following basic factors: economic, social, spiritual, scientific-technical, military and political.

The preparation of the work has not been without certain omissions. For example, it would have been possible to provide a clearer definition and description of military-economic and scientific potentials as has been done in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia and other publications. In our view, in a more profound and complete manner and considering the present-day situation they should have shown the decisive advantage of the military organization of the socialist states and the role of the Marxist-Leninist parties in achieving this.

As a whole, the work "Marksistsko-leninskoye ucheniye o voyne i armii" makes a substantial contribution to a further elaboration of Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war and the army and will be a useful aid for officers, officer candidates and students in the higher military schools in increasing

their ideological-theoretical level and in carrying out the tasks of combat and political training.

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